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ARTICLES
The Rights of Women in the Inter-American





The development of standards related to the human rights of
women within the context of the inter-American system of human rights
has been gradual and recent, mostly gathering steam after 1994. This
process reached an important climax on November 16, 2009, when the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights issued its first comprehensive
ruling on women's rights issues in the case of Gonzdlez et al. v. Mexico
(hereinafter "Cotton Field").'
Cotton Field relates to the unresolved investigation of "the disap-
pearance and subsequent death" of three young women' in the locality
of Ciudad Juirez, Mexico-deaths that occurred in a highly publicized
context of irregularities, delays, and impunity.' The representatives
alleged before the Court that the State of Mexico had failed to act with
the due diligence necessary to prevent, investigate, and sanction these
crimes.' The Court found a significant number of violations under the
American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter the "American
Convention")5 and the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention,
Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women (hereinafter
* Human Rights Specialist, Special Rapporteurship on the Rights of Women, Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights; Professional Lecturer in Law, George Washington
University Law School. The views expressed are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Secretary General of
the Organization of American States, or the Organization of American States.
1. GonzAlez et. al. v. Mexico (Cotton Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
2. The victims in this case were Laura Berenice Ramos Mondrrez (seventeen years of age),
Claudia Ivette Gonzdlez (twenty years of age), and Esmeralda Herrera Monreal (fifteen years of
age). Id. 2; Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), infra note 12, 1.
3. Id.
4. Id. 109.
5. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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the "Convention of Bel6m do Par").' This ruling was followed by two
judgments from the same tribunal in the cases of Ferndndez Ortega et
al. v. Mexico and Rosendo Cantd and other v. Mexico-issued on
August 30 and 31, 2010, respectively-related to the rape and torture of
two indigenous women by members of the military in the locality of
Guerrero, Mexico, and the lack of investigation and sanction of these
crimes.
These three rulings in a way represent the conclusion of a process
that began with the adoption of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard in
1994. The Convention of Beldm do Pard is the most ratified instrument
in the inter-American system of human rights and is still the only multi-
lateral treaty in the world that centers exclusively on the problem of
violence against women.8 This process was also undoubtedly propelled
by a wave of historic case decisions and country and regional thematic
reports published by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(hereinafter "Inter-American Commission" or "Commission"),' empha-
sizing crucial principles pertaining to the rights of women.' 0 The Com-
mission also submitted the cases of Cotton Field, Ferndndez Ortega,
6. Cotton Field, 1 602 (4-9).
7. Fernindez Ortega et. al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 2010); Rosendo Canti and other
v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 2010).
8. The Convention of Beldm do Pard has been ratified by thirty-two member states of the
Organization of American States. See Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment,
and Eradication of Violence Against Women pmbl. & arts. 1-9, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301,
1438 U.N.T.S. 63.
9. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is one of two bodies of the Inter-
American System on Human Rights that has been entrusted by the Member States of the
Organization of American States to promote the observance and defense of human rights
throughout the hemisphere. In the exercise of its mandate, it receives, reviews, and investigates
individual petitions that allege human rights violations, including those with gender-specific
causes, based on the principles advanced by key regional human rights instruments, such as the
American Convention, the American Declaration, and the Convention of Beldm do Pard. Any
person, group of persons, or nongovernmental organization may present a petition to the
Commission alleging violations of the rights protected in the American Convention and other
regional instruments. Petitions can also be presented before the inter-American system of human
rights under the American Declaration in cases involving States that are not state parties to the
American Convention. See American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, at arts. 34-51.
10. See, e.g., Martin de Mejfa v. Peru, Case 10.970, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 5/
96, OEA/Ser.L.IVIII.91, doc. 7 (1996); Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L.NIH.I 11, doc. 20 (2001); Gonzdlez P6rez v. Mexico,
Case 11.565, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 53/01, OEA/Ser.L./VIII.1 11, doc. 20 (2001);
da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 54/01,
OEA/Ser.L./VIH.I 11, doc. 20 (2001); Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. [IACHR], Access to Justice for
Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L./WII, doc. 68 (Jan. 20, 2007); IACHR,
The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Judrez, Mexico: The Right to Be Free from
Violence and Discrimination, OEA/Ser.L.V/II. 117, doc. 44 (Mar. 7, 2003).
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and Rosendo Cantd for the contentious review of the Court when it con-
sidered the State of Mexico had not complied with the recommendations
issued in the context of its merits rulings."
Four themes had been the cornerstone of the precedent of the Com-
mission related to the rights of women before the Court judgments in the
cases of Cotton Field, Ferndndez Ortega, and Rosendo Cantd: (1) vio-
lence against women; (2) discrimination; (3) due diligence; and (4)
access to justice. 1 2 Most of the precedent of the Commission related to
these four themes had been geared toward shedding light on the content
of the States' obligation to organize their structure-including the work
of all sectors such as justice, health, and education-to prevent, investi-
gate, sanction, and offer reparations for acts of violence and discrimina-
tion against women in different settings and sociopolitical contexts.
This Article offers a contemporary analysis of women's rights stan-
dards in the inter-American system of human rights by reviewing the
legacy of the aforementioned three judgments of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in four key areas: (1) violence against women;
(2) discrimination; (3) due diligence; and (4) access to justice. The anal-
ysis is undertaken in light of the precedent of the inter-American system
related to human rights and the rights of women, and international legal
developments. It is important to note that even though this Article cen-
ters mostly on the case decisions issued by the Inter-American Commis-
sion and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the precedent of
the inter-American system related to women's rights also consists of a
11. In cases where the State at issue "has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court in accordance with Article 62 of the American Convention, and the Commission [deems]
that the State has not complied with the recommendations [issued in a] report approved" under the
American Convention, it can refer the case to the Court for its review. See Rules of Procedure of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 45 (2009), available at http://www.cidh.
org/basicos/english/Basicl8.RulesOfProcedurelACHR.htm; see also Application to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, Case of Campo Algodonero: Claudia Ivette Gonzdlez,
Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Mondrrez (Cases 12.496-12.498) against
the United Mexican States, (Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. Nov. 4, 2007), available at http://www.cidh.
oas.org/demandas/12.496-7-8%20Carnpo%20Algodonero%20Mexico%204%20noviembre%2020
07%20ENG.pdf; Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Valentina
Rosendo Cantd (Case 12.579) against the United States of Mexico, (Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. Aug.
2, 2009), available at http://www.cidh.org/demandas/1 2.579%20Valentina%20Rosendo%20Cantu
%2OMexico%202ago09%20ENGLISH.pdf; Application to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, Case of Inds Fernindez Ortega (Case 12.580) against the United Mexican States, (Inter-
Am. Comm'n H.R. May 7, 2009), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.580%20Ines
%20Femandez%200rtega%20Mexico%207mayoO9%20ENGLISH.pdf.
12. It is also important to note that the Commission has delved into the content of other rights
contained in the American Convention in some cases, such as the right to privacy established in
Article 11 and the right to protection of the family in Article 17, but it has done so with a more
limited scope. See, e.g., X v. Argentina, Case 10.506, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 38/96,
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997).
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diversity of pronouncements and recommendations issued by the Com-
mission in the realm of thematic reports, country reports, and in the reso-
lution of precautionary measures.' 3 A series of advisory opinions and
provisional measures adopted by the Inter-American Court are also part
of this precedent.14
This Article suggests that the three Inter-American Court of Human
Rights judgments represent both a culmination and beginning for the
inter-American system of human rights in regards to women's rights
issues. On the one hand, they consolidate what the Inter-American Com-
mission and other international human rights monitoring bodies have
been stating for years about the interrelated problems of discrimination
and violence against women, and the scope of state obligations to pre-
vent, investigate, sanction, and offer reparations for these acts. On the
other hand, they represent a beginning and a crucial point of departure
by setting groundbreaking standards in the fields of due diligence,
access to justice, and reparations for victims and their family members
in cases of violence and discrimination against women.
The Article also discusses the legacy of these three judgments-in
the four areas identified above-in terms of the opportunities and chal-
lenges they present to the inter-American system of human rights in set-
ting legal standards related to the human rights of women. In the
author's view, a human rights standard adopted by the inter-American
system has two sets of implications for the State at issue in regards to
the protection of women's rights. On the one hand, a human rights stan-
dard constitutes a legal obligation for the State involved and sheds light
on the content of this obligation. In this sense, the Commission and
Court decisions discussed in this Article primarily constitute legal and
authoritative pronouncements related to the scope of individual articles
of the American Convention and other regional instruments. On the
other hand, a human rights standard issued by the inter-American system
offers an important guideline for the State implicated of how to ade-
quately and effectively implement, at the national level, the individual
rights contained in the governing instruments of the inter-American sys-
13. See Martin de Mejia; Morales de Sierra; Gonzdlez Pirez; da Penha Maia Fernandes;
Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, supra note 10; The Situation of
the Rights of Women in Ciudad Judrez, Mexico: The Right to Be Free from Violence and
Discrimination, supra note 10; see also IACHR, Access to Maternal Health Services from a
Human Rights Perspective, OEA/Ser.L./V/II, doc. 69 (June 6, 2010); IACHR, Violence and
Discrimination Against Women in the Armed Conflict in Colombia, OEA/Ser.L.N/III, doc. 67
(Oct. 18, 2006). A complete list of the country and regional thematic reports and precautionary
measures issued by the Commission pertaining to the rights of women is available at http://www.
cidh.oas.org/.
14. Information related to advisory opinions and provisional measures adopted by the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights can be found at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/.
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tem of human rights. Therefore, the development of standards within the
framework of the inter-American system of human rights, and the cur-
rent opportunities and challenges offered by the recent Court judgments,
will be reviewed in this Article in light of these considerations.
This Article is divided into five parts. In the first part, it discusses
the development of women's rights standards in the inter-American sys-
tem of human rights leading to the Cotton Field, Ferndndez Ortega, and
Rosendo Canti judgments, as background to the discussion related to
the legacy of these Inter-American Court of Human Rights judgments.
The second part of this article delves comprehensively into each of the
three judgments of the Court, reviewing the main allegations presented
by the Commission and the petitioners before this tribunal, and the main
violations and legal conclusions reached in each case. The author dis-
cusses in the third part the legacy of these three Court judgments in the
spheres of violence, discrimination, due diligence, and access to justice,
and highlights its contributions to standard-setting related to the rights of
women within the framework of the inter-American system of human
rights. The fourth part reviews various opportunities that these judg-
ments provide to the system to continue developing women's rights
standards, and the challenges ahead. The Article closes with some final
conclusions and observations.
II. STANDARDS RELATED TO THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN THE INTER-
AMERICAN SYSTEM: FROM THEIR ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT
The development of women's rights standards within the frame-
work of the inter-American system of human rights, between 1994 and
the decision of the Court in Cotton Field at the end of 2009, happened
mostly at the level of the Inter-American Commission. The most signifi-
cant component of this progression was a line of decisions on the merits
adopted by the Inter-American Commission related to the problems of
violence and discrimination against women. It is important to note that
this development has also been complemented by the Commission's
publication of country reports, country chapters, and thematic reports
delving into priority themes for women in the Americas, and the issu-
ance of precautionary measures with a bearing on the rights of women."
A. Legal Developments at the Inter-American Commission
Related to Cases
In the sphere of merits decisions, two significant and distinct
phases can be identified in this standard-setting process at the Commis-
15. See id.
8232011]
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sion level between 1994 and 2009: There is a first line of merits deci-
sions decided between 1996 and 2001 that laid the groundwork for what
the system's standards are today in the fields of violence, discrimination,
due diligence, and access to justice. Some noteworthy cases that were
decided by the Commission in this phase related to the issues discussed
in this Article, and include Raquel Mart(n de Mejia v. Peru (1996),
Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala (2001), Ana, Beatriz,
and Celia Gonzdlez Pdrez v. Mexico (2001), and Maria Da Penha Maia
Fernandes v. Brazil (2001), among others. There is a second line of
merits decisions decided between 2007 and 2009 that gave more content
to the existing standards and opened the ground for Court rulings related
to women's rights. These include decisions in the cases of Claudia Ivette
Gonzdlez and others v. Mexico (Cotton Field) (2007), Ines Ferndndez
Ortega v. Mexico (2008), Valentina Rosendo Cantd v. Mexico (2009),
and Karen Atala v. Chile (2009), among others.
It is important to note that the Commission also published, between
1995 and 2009, a number of admissibility reports and friendly settlement
agreements addressing legal obligations related to the civil, political,
economic, social, and cultural rights of women.' 6
B. First Line of Merits Rulings by the Inter-American
Commission (1994-2001)
The first line of merits decisions issued by the Commission was
mostly devoted to analyzing cases raising violations under the American
Convention for presumed acts of discrimination and violence against
women committed by different States, and the problem of impunity
toward these crimes. Even though most of these cases were decided
under the provisions of the American Convention, in the case of Maria
Da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil-probably the most well-known
case decided in this phase-the Commission applied the Convention of
Bel6m do Pari for the first time." The Commission also found viola-
tions under the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Tor-
16. See, e.g., Sdnchez Villalobos v. Costa Rica, Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 25/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5 (2004); I.V. v. Bolivia, Petition 270-07, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 40/08, OEA/Ser.L.N/III.134, doc. 5 (2008); Del Rosario Guzmin
Albarracin v. Ecuador, Petition 1055-06, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 76/08, OEA/Ser.L./
V/II.134, doc. 5 (2008); T611ez Blanco v. Costa Rica, Petition 712-03, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 29/07, OEA/Ser.L.N/II.130, doc. 22 (2007); V6liz Franco v. Guatemala, Petition 95-
04, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 92106, OEA/Ser.L.N/I.127, doc. 4 (2007); Gonzales v.
United States, Petition 1490-05, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 52107, OEA/Ser.L./V/
II.130, doc. 22 (2007); Mestanza ChAvez v. Peru, Petition 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 71/03, OEA/Ser.L.N/11.118, doc. 5 (2003); Carabantes Galleguillos v. Chile, Petition
12.046, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 33/02, OEA/Ser.L.N/I. 117, doc. 1 (2002).
17. Da Penha Maia Fernandes, Eil 51-58.
824 [Vol. 65:819
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ture in the case of Ana, Beatriz, and Celia Gonzdlez Pirez v. Mexico.18
The author observes that, in this legal phase, the Commission
began to set standards in the following thematic areas: (1) the obligation
of States, including their respective judicial branches, to act with the due
diligence necessary and without delay to prevent, investigate, sanction,
and offer reparations for acts of violence against women, even when
these are perpetrated by non-State actors; (2) the obligation to guarantee
a de jure and de facto access to adequate and effective judicial remedies
when acts of violence against women occur; (3) the obligation of public
officials working in all branches of the government to treat victims and
their family members with respect and dignity throughout the legal pro-
cess; (4) the duty to adopt public measures to eradicate all forms of
discrimination against women and stereotypical patterns of behavior that
promote their unequal treatment in their societies; (5) the legal charac-
terization of rape as torture when perpetrated by public officials; and (6)
the duty to investigate and prosecute these crimes in impartial judicial
avenues.19
This section briefly discusses the main allegations and findings of
some of the most important cases of this first phase to exemplify how
these principles were first developed in the Commission's case law. The
section presents the cases in chronological order based on when they
were decided.
1. RAQUEL MARTiN DE MEJiA V. PERU
In this merits report, the Commission first addressed the question of
rape as torture in the context of an individual case and under the Ameri-
can Convention and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Pun-
ish Torture.20 The petition alleged that Raquel Martin de Mejia was
raped twice by Peruvian military personnel in June 1989, based on the
accusation that she and her husband were considered subversive and
members of the Movimiento Revolucionario Tdpac Amaru."
In its analysis, the Commission advanced a number of key legal
principles related to the investigation, judgment, and sanction of acts of
18. Gonzdlez Perez, IN 4, 46-52.
19. See generally Martin de Mejia; Morales de Sierra; Gonzdlez Perez; Do Penha Maia
Fernandes.
20. See generally Martin de MejIa. The Commission found, in the context of this case, several
violations under the American Convention on behalf of Raquel Martin de Mejfa, including a
violation to the general obligation to respect and guarantee the rights contained in said instrument
(Article 1.1); the right to humane treatment (Article 5); the right to protection of honor and dignity
(Article 11); the right to due process (Article 8); and the right to an effective recourse (Article 25).
See id. § VI.
21. Id. H 7-8.
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rape when they are perpetrated by public officials. In addressing the rape
itself, the Commission determined that each of the three elements set
forth in the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
had been met to prove torture; namely, (1) "an intentional act through
which physical and mental pain and suffering is inflicted on a person;"
(2) "committed with a purpose;" and (3) "by a public official or by a
private person acting at the instigation of the former."2 2 When analyzing
these elements, the Commission took into account the physical and psy-
chological suffering caused by the rape, the potential for ostracism for
the victim if she were to report these acts, and how rape can be per-
formed with the intention to punish and intimidate the victim involved.2 3
The Commission furthermore ruled that the right to judicial protec-
tion set forth in Article 25 of the American Convention is to be
understood as the right of every individual to go to a tribunal when
any of his rights have been violated . .. to obtain a judicial investiga-
tion conducted by a competent, impartial[,] and independent tribunal
that will establish whether or not a violation has taken place and will
set, when appropriate, adequate compensation.24
In the framework of this analysis, the Commission significantly consid-
ered that it would have been impossible for Raquel Martfn de Mejia to
access domestic recourses to remedy the human rights violations she
suffered, in violation of the right to judicial protection and guarantees
contained in Articles 8.1 and 25 of the American Convention. 25 The
Commission also underscored that the investigation of an act of sexual
violence should be "purposeful" in seeking the truth and should not
depend on the initiative of the victim or her family, thereby furthering
the possibility of a judicial remedy.2 6
2. MARIA EUGENIA MORALES DE SIERRA V. GUATEMALA
In this case," the Commission found violations of Articles 1, 2, 11,
17, and 24 of the American Convention, when the provisions of the Gua-
temalan Civil Code, addressing domestic relations, assigned different
legal responsibilities and duties exclusively to the husband, based on his
role as the income-provider, and to the wife, based on her role as mother
22. Id. § V(B)(2). The Commission additionally determined that the rape by military officers




25. Id. § V(B)(2)(b).
26. Id.
27. Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 4/01,
OEA/Ser.L.N/II.1 11, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
826 [Vol. 65:819
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and homemaker.28 The Commission examined whether the distinction
contained in the Civil Code based on sex was premised on "reasonable
and objective criteria."2 9 The Commission assessed whether the distinc-
tion pursued a legitimate aim and employed means proportional to the
end sought.3 o
In ruling that the distinction violated the guarantees of equality and
nondiscrimination contained in the American Convention, the Commis-
sion found that far from ensuring the "equality of rights and adequate
balancing of responsibilities within marriage, the cited provisions insti-
tutionalized imbalances in the rights and duties of the spouses." 3 1 The
analysis considered that the provisions "of the Civil Code appl[ied] ster-
eotyp[ical] notions of the roles of women and men which perpetuate de
facto discrimination against women in the family sphere."3 2 The Com-
mission also explicitly manifested its concern over the dismal conse-
quences of discrimination against women and stereotypical notions of
their social roles, including their potential for violence against women.
3. ANA, BEATRIZ, AND CELIA GONZALEZ PtREZ V. MEXICO
In this case,34 the petitioners alleged that the sisters Ana, Beatriz,
and Celia Gonzdlez P6rez, members of the Tzeltal indigenous peoples,
were separated from their mother and illegally detained, raped, and tor-
tured by a group of military personnel during a period of two hours in
the state of Chiapas, Mexico.3 ' They also alleged that these crimes had
remained in impunity due to the transfer of the investigation to the mili-
tary jurisdiction, a forum devoid of the impartiality necessary to provide
redress for human rights violations.36
In finding several violations of the American Convention and the
Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture," the Com-
28. Id. 83.




33. Id. T 52.
34. Gonzdlez Pdrez v. Mexico, Case 11.565, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 53/01,
OEA/Ser.L./VIII.1 11, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
35. Id. 1 2.
36. Id.
37. The Commission concluded that the State of Mexico was responsible for violating several
rights contained in the American Convention, including the right to humane treatment and privacy
(Articles 5 and 11); the right to personal liberty (Article 7); and the right to a fair trial and judicial
protection (Articles 8 and 25) to the detriment of the three sisters. The Inter-American
Commission also established that the Mexican State was responsible for the violation of Articles 6
and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. The Commission also held
that these violations were particularly serious in the case of Celia Gonzdlez Pdrez since she was
8272011]1
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mission concluded that the State failed to fulfill its obligation under the
American Convention "to guarantee the exercise of the rights and free-
doms recognized in [said] instrument with respect to persons under their
jurisdiction."3 Citing the Inter-American Court of Human Rights deci-
sion in the case of Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, the Commission
established that under this obligation, the State had "the duty to organize
[its] government apparatus, and, in general, all structures through which
State power is exercised, in . .. a way . .. capable of ensuring the full
and free exercise of human rights" at the national level.
In this general framework, the Commission held that the acts of
rape committed by military officials against the sisters amounted to tor-
ture, referring to the precedent set in the case of Raquel Mart(n de Mejia
described above, cases related to this issue decided by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and pronouncements from
the United Nations Special Rapporteur against Torture."0 The Commis-
sion also observed that this case was characterized by complete impu-
nity,4 1 highlighting that six years had passed since the alleged acts had
occurred, and the State had failed to prosecute and sanction those
responsible and had yet to compensate the victims for the injuries and
losses resulting from these acts."2 The Commission also concluded that
"the pain and humiliation suffered by the" victims were aggravated
since, as indigenous women, they did not know the language of their
aggressors and had suffered the repudiation of their own communities
"as a consequence of the violations.""3
The Commission recommended to the Mexican State that it
"[c]onduct a complete, impartial, and effective investigation" of these
crimes "within the regular criminal courts in Mexico" and adequately
sixteen at the time of the events, finding a violation of Article 19 of the American Convention. Id.
60-61, 90, 94.
38. Id. 85.
39. Id. (citing Veldsquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Preliminary Objection, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, 91 (June 26 1987)).
40. Id. 45-52.
41. Impunity was defined as:
the failure by States to fulfill their obligation to investigate the violation of rights
and to impose the appropriate measures on the perpetrators, in particular from a
legal standpoint, so that they can be prosecuted and receive the appropriate
penalties; to guarantee victims effective resources and remedy for prejudice
suffered; and to take the measures necessary to avoid the repetition of these
violations.
Id. 86.
42. In the process, the Commission underscored that the investigation had been "transferred
to the military courts, which clearly ha[d] no competence . . . and lack[ed] the impartiality
necessary to" investigate and sanction these acts. Id. 88.
43. Id. 1 95.
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compensate the victims."
4. MARIA DA PENHA MAIA FERNANDES v. BRAZIL
The case of Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes45 was presented to
the Commission by a victim of domestic violence in Brazil who had
tragically become a paraplegic as a consequence of the beatings and
homicide attempts of her husband.46 Even though the victim had submit-
ted several complaints pertaining to these acts before the authorities, the
petitioners alleged that this case had been pending over fifteen years
before the criminal courts in Brazil without resolution.4 7
In its ruling, the Commission applied the Convention of Bel6m do
Pard for the first time and found that the State had violated its human
rights obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing, sanctioning,
and eradicating domestic violence by not condemning and sanctioning
the perpetrator for seventeen years.4 8 Furthermore, it found the existence
of a general pattern of state tolerance and judicial inefficiency toward
cases of domestic violence. 4 9 The Commission was emphatic in finding
that the duty of the State to exercise due diligence goes beyond the duty
to prosecute and convict, and also includes the duty "to prevent these
degrading practices.""o
In finding a violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the American Conven-
tion, the Commission considered that more than seventeen years had
passed since the launching of the investigation and the case against the
accused remained open without a final ruling.5 I The Commission also
held "that the domestic judicial decisions in this case reveal[ed] ineffi-
ciency, negligence, and [an avid] failure to act on the part of the Brazil-
ian judicial authorities."5 2 The Commission considered that "judicial
ineffectiveness . . . creates a climate . .. conducive to domestic violence,
since society sees no evidence of willingness by the State, as the repre-
sentative of the society, to take effective action to sanction such acts."5
44. Id. 1 96.
45. Da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
54/01, OEA/Ser.L.IV/II.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
46. Id. 2.
47. Id.
48. The Inter-American Commission found in this case that the State had violated the rights
of the victim to effective judicial protection and guarantees protected under Articles 8 and 25 of
the American Convention, in conjunction with "the general obligation to respect and guarantee
these rights" under Article 1.1 of said instrument, as well as Article 7 of the Convention of Beldm
do Pard. Id. 60(2).
49. Id. 55.
50. Id. 56.
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The Commission issued a series of concrete recommendations for
the State to address the individual needs of the victim, as well as the
pattern of State tolerance, including the prompt completion of the crimi-
nal proceedings against the perpetrator; the performance of "a serious,
impartial, and exhaustive investigation to determine responsibilities for
the irregularities"; and the continuance of the state reform process to end
the tolerance of violence against women.54
C. Second Line of Merits Rulings by the Inter-American Commission
(2007-2009)
A noteworthy second line of cases is spearheaded at the Commis-
sion with the approval of merits reports in the cases of Cotton Field
(March 9, 2007),11 Ferndndez Ortega (October 30, 2008),56 and
Rosendo Cantd (March 27, 2009)." These cases constitute the basis for
the three judgments later issued by the Court between 2009 and 2010.
In the case of Cotton Field, the petitioners alleged before the Com-
mission that the State of Mexico had committed a number of human
rights violations due to irregularities and inconsistencies in the investi-
gation of the disappearance and subsequent death of three women in the
locality of Ciudad Juirez.58 It is important to note as background that the
Commission had undertaken an on-site visit to Ciudad Judrez, in Febru-
ary 2002, upon numerous communications from hundreds of organiza-
tions and individuals reporting "that more than two hundred women had
been brutally murdered in Ciudad Juirez since 1993.""5 The communi-
cations claimed that most of these crimes were never duly investigated
or sanctioned, due to the widespread discrimination against women
ingrained in the behavior of public officials. 0 By publishing its report of
the visit in March 2003, the Commission joined a variety of national
54. Id. 161.
55. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, 48.
56. Application (Case 12.580), supra note 11, 26.
57. Application (Case 12.579), supra note 11, 17.
58. For a full description of the petitioners' allegations, see GonzAlez v. Mexico, Petition 281/
02, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 16/05, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.124, doc. 5 5-7 (2006);
Herrera Monreal v. Mexico, Petition 282/02, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 17/05, OEA/
Ser.L.N/Hl.124, doc. 5 5-7 (2006); Ramos Mondrrez v. Mexico, Petition 283/02, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 18/05, OEA/Ser.L./VII.124, doc. 5 H 5-7 (2006). During the
processing of these cases, the Commission decided to accumulate them under Article 29.1(d) of its
Rules for Procedure since they occurred in the same locality and time frame, they had been
investigated jointly by the State of Mexico, and the petitioners alleged that the facts had unfolded
in a context of impunity toward violent acts by the State authorities. See Application (Cases
12.496-12.498), supra note 11, 47.
59. The Situation of the Rights of Women in Ciudad Judrez, Mexico: The Right to Be Free
from Violence and Discrimination, supra note 10, T 2.
60. Id 9 6-8.
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entities, international agencies, Special Rapporteurs, and civil society
organizations in expressing its concern over the pattern of disappear-
ances and murders in the locality and the impunity that permeated these
crimes.61 As part of its monitoring of the situation in Ciudad Juirez, the
Commission processed since 2002 the cases of Claudia Ivette Gonzdlez,
Laura Berenice Ramos Mondrrez, and Esmeralda Herrera Monreal-
better known as Cotton Field-as paradigmatic cases of the serious pat-
tern of violence against women taking place in Ciudad Juirez, ruling on
their merits on March 9, 2007.62
In its merits decision, the Commission held that the Mexican State
was responsible for several human rights violations under the American
Convention and the Convention of Bel6m do Pard6 3 for failing to adopt
reasonable measures to protect the lives and prevent the murders of the
three victims, even though it had knowledge of a pattern of disappear-
ances and murders of women who were reported as missing and had not
exercised due diligence to identify the persons actually responsible for
these crimes.' Furthermore, the Commission considered in its decision
that the family members of the victims had been consistently mistreated
by the State authorities throughout the criminal investigation and had
not been adequately informed of the progress of the investigations.6" The
Commission recommended that the State undertake a serious, impartial,
and exhaustive investigation of the three murders to identify and sanc-
tion those actually responsible, among other recommendations.6 6
These cases were followed by the Commission approval of the mer-
its reports in the cases of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd." The
petitioners alleged before the Commission that the State of Mexico had
failed to duly investigate and sanction the rape, torture, and discrimina-
tion of two indigenous women by agents of the Mexican army in the
State of Guerrero, in violation of the American Convention, the Conven-
61. Id.
62. Cotton Field, 1, 160-267.
63. The Commission found violations of Articles 4, 8.1, and 25 of the American Convention
in relation to the obligations contained in Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention to the
detriment of the three victims and Article 7 of the Convention of Beldm do Pard. The Commission
also found a violation of Article 19 of the American Convention to the detriment of Laura
Berenice Ramos Mondrrez and Esmeralda Herrera Monreal, and Article 5(1) of the American
Convention "to the detriment of the next-of-kin of the three victims," under Articles 1.1 and 2 of
the American Convention. See id. 268; Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 12, IT
48, 301.
64. Cotton Field, IN 160-267; Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, 19 48, 49,
app. 1.
65. Cotton Field, 257-67.
66. Cotton Field; Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, 1 49.
67. See generally Application (Case 12.580), supra note 11; Application (Case No. 12.579),
supra note 11.
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tion of Bel6m do Pard, and the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture, among other international instruments.6 8 After find-
ing a comprehensive set of violations under these three instruments,6 9
the Commission ordered the State to conduct a serious, impartial, and
exhaustive investigation before the ordinary criminal courts to identify
and sanction those responsible; to adopt measures to ensure that the mil-
itary justice system was disqualified from hearing human rights viola-
tions involving sexual violence; and to offer the victims and their next-
of-kin reparations, among other measures.70
In the three cases, the Commission gave the State of Mexico sev-
eral months to undertake steps to comply with the recommendations
issued by the Commission." After noting the absence of substantive
progress in the implementation of its recommendations, the Commission
decided to present these cases to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights for its contentious review.72
Before proceeding with the analysis of the path of these three cases
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the following sec-
tion, the author notes that also during this period the Commission issued
its first ruling related to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
in the system-the case of Karen Atala v. Chile-on December 18,
2009." The petitioners alleged before the system that the State of Chile
68. See Femndez Ortega v. Mexico, Petition 540-04, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
94/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. In 7-12 (2007); Rosendo Cantil v. Mexico, Petition 972-
03, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 93/06, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.127, doc. 4, rev. 6-14 (2007).
69. In regards to Valentina Rosendo Canti, the Commission found violations of Articles 5.1,
8.1, 11, 19, and 25 of the American Convention, in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the same
instrument. The Commission also found violations of Article 7 of the Convention of Bel6m do
Pard and Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.
With respect to her family members, the Commission concluded that the State was responsible for
violating Article 5.1 of the American Convention, in conjunction with the obligation to respect
and ensure those rights set forth in Article 1.1 of said instrument. See Rosendo Cantd, T 5;
Application (Case 12.579), supra note 11, 1 17. In the case of Inds Ferndndez Ortega, the
Commission also found violations of Articles 5.1, 8.1, 11, and 25 of the American Convention, in
connection with Article 1.1 of the said instrument. It also held that the State was responsible for
violating Articles 7 of the Convention of Beldm do Pard, and Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture to the detriment of the victim. "Regarding
her next of kin, the Commission conclude[d] that the State [was] responsible for violations of
Article 5.1 of the American Convention[,] in connection with the general obligation to respect and
ensure the rights" contained in Article 1.1 of said instrument. Ferndndez Ortega, U 5, 216;
Application (Case 12.580), supra note 11, T 26.
70. Application (Case 12.580), supra note 11, 27; Application (Case 12.579), supra note 11,
18.
71. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, 919 50-59; Application (Case 12.580),
supra note 11, 9 28-33; Application (Case 12.579), supra note 11, In 19-22.
72. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498) supra note 11, 1 59; Application (Case 12.580), supra
note 11, 9 35; Application (Case 12.579), supra note 11, T 22.
73. Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Case of Karen Atala and
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was internationally responsible for violations allegedly committed in the
context of a custody proceeding.74 The petitioners claimed that said pro-
ceeding ended in a ruling by the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile that
revoked Karen Atala's custody of her three daughters, M., V., and R.
(ages five, six, and ten, respectively), based exclusively on discrimina-
tory prejudices regarding her sexual orientation." This is the first ruling
of the Commission finding a violation of the rights to equality and non-
discrimination protected under Article 24 of the American Convention
in the realm of sexual orientation and custody issues." The merits ruling
also includes precedent-making analysis pertaining to the scope of the
rights to privacy, protection of the family, the right of girls, and the right
to a fair trial and to judicial protection, all in the framework of the gen-
eral obligation of States to guarantee human rights under Article 1.1 of
the American Convention.7 7 This case was also presented to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights on September 17, 2010, for its con-
tentious review.7
It is also noteworthy that during this period, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights addressed women's rights issues for the first
time in its judgment of Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru on Novem-
ber 25, 2006.11 The case related "to the execution of 'Operative Transfer
1' within the Miguel Castro Castro Prison" in Peru, "during which the
State [had] allegedly . . . caused the death of at least forty-two inmates,
injured 175 inmates, and sub[jected] . . . 322 [other] inmates to a cruel,
inhuman[e], and degrading treatment" and the aftermath of said trans-
fer.80 The Court considered proven that the attack specifically started in
Daughters (Case 12.502) Against the State of Chile, (Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R. Sept. 17, 2010) M
23-24, available at www.cidh.org/demandas/12.502ENG.pdf.
74. Id. 2.
75. Id. 1, 2.
76. In its merits report, the Commission concluded that the State of Chile violated Karen
Atala's right to equal protection without discrimination enshrined in Article 24 of the American
Convention, as it relates to the duty to respect and guarantee rights as established in Article 1.1. In
addition, the Commission established that the State violated the rights of Karen Atala and her
daughters to live free from abusive and arbitrary interferences in their private and family life,
rights protected under Articles 11.2 and 17.1 of the American Convention, and the rights of her
daughters as children under Articles 19 and 17.4 of the American Convention, all as they relate to
the general obligation to respect and guarantee rights as established in Article 1.1 of the American
Convention. The Commission also established that the State violated the right to adequate judicial
protection and guarantees of due process of Karen Atala as enshrined in Articles 8.1 and 25.1 of
the American Convention, in conjunction with the general obligation to respect and guarantee
rights under Article 1.1 thereof. See generally id. i 23-24.
77. Id.
78. Id. 1.
79. See generally Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160 (Nov. 25, 2006).
80. Id. 3. The acts occurred in the context of the Peruvian armed conflict that affected the
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the prison's pavilion occupied by the female inmates, including women
who were pregnant.
The Court included a number of landmark and bold pronounce-
ments in this judgment related to incidents of sexual violence suffered
by the inmates, even though the allegations originating the presentation
of the case before the Court were general in nature. First, the Court
found a violation of Article 5 of the American Convention and inter-
preted its scope referencing the Convention of Bel6m do Pard.8 2 The
Court described this instrument as part of the "international corpus
juris" related to the "protection of [a] woman's right to humane treat-
ment, of which the American Convention forms part."8  Second, the
Court, for the first time, stressed that gender-based violence is a form of
discrimination following precedent from the Committee on the Elimina-
tion of Discrimination against Women, and the aggravated nature of
human rights violations when they are committed against women.
Third, the Court construed incidents of forced nudity, ill-treatment,
and the vaginal inspection of the female inmates, including those preg-
nant, as acts of sexual violence that could amount to torture, and defined
the term broadly." Following international jurisprudence, the Court held
that "sexual violence consists of actions with a sexual nature committed
with a person without their consent, which besides including the physi-
cal invasion of the human body, may include acts that do not imply
penetration or even any physical contact whatsoever."
8 The Court also
underscored the "devastating physical, emotional, and psychological
consequences" of rape when perpetrated by State actors against women
that are detained, since they are "subject to the complete control and
power of state agents."8 The Court also refers to the duty to act with
due diligence codified in Article 7(b) of the Convention of Bel6m do
ParA to find violations under Articles 8.1 and 25 of the American Con-
vention for failing to investigate and sanction these violations. 8
Therefore, in its decision in the case of Miguel Castro Castro
country between 1980 and 2000, where numerous human rights violations have been documented
by the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation in the same country. Id. 197(3), (6).




85. Id. H 308-09. The Court held "that the acts of sexual violence to which an inmate was
submitted under an alleged finger vaginal 'examination' . . . constituted ... rape that due to its
effects [amounted to] torture." Id. 312.
86. Id. 306 (citing Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment,
688 (Sept. 2, 1998)).
87. Id. H 307, 311, 313.
88. Id. H 378, 379, 394, 408.
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Prison, the Court begins adopting its own positions related to gender
issues in the framework of its general analysis of human rights obliga-
tions in individual cases. It continues this process in the judgments of
Cotton Field, Ferndndez Ortega, and Rosendo Cantd, as will be dis-
cussed in the following section.
III. THE CASES OF COTTON FIELD, FERNANDEZ ORTEGA, AND
ROSENDO CANTO BEFORE THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
In this section, the author describes the main allegations before the
Inter-American Court in the cases of Cotton Field, Ferndndez Ortega
and Rosendo Cantd, and the main findings of the Court. In the next
section, the author discusses the legacy of these three judgments in
regards to four areas: violence, discrimination, due diligence, and access
to justice.
A. Gonzllez et al. v. Mexico ("Cotton Field")
On November 4, 2007, the Inter-American Commission presented
an application before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights alleg-
ing that the Mexican State was responsible for a series of irregularities
and delays committed in the investigation of the disappearance and sub-
sequent death of Laura Berenice Ramos Monirrez (seventeen years of
age), Claudia Ivette GonzdIlez (twenty years of age), and Esmeralda Her-
rera Monreal (fifteen years of age), in the locality of Ciudad Judrez."9
In essence, the Commission90 and the representatives 91 argued
before the Court that the three young women, all of them of limited
economic resources, were first reported as disappeared by their family
89. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, 1 1.
90. The Commission for its part asked the Court to declare the State responsible for several
rights embodied in the American Convention to the detriment of the three victims, including the
right to life (Article 4), the right to a fair trial (Article 8.1), the right to judicial protection (Article
25), and the rights of the child (Article 19) of Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice
Ramos Mondrrez, all within the overarching obligation of the State under Article 1.1 to respect
and guarantee said human rights, and the duty to adopt legislation and other measures that may be
necessary under Article 2. The Commission also framed its allegations in the framework of the
right of women to live free from violence established in Article 7 of the Convention of Beldm do
Pard. In regards to the victims' family members, the Commission alleged violations of the right to
humane treatment (Article 5) and violations of the rights to a fair trial and judicial protection
(Articles 8.1 and 25) of the American Convention. In addition to the allegations presented by the
Commission, the representatives of the victims asked the Court to declare the State responsible for
violating the rights of the three victims to humane treatment (Article 5), the right to personal
liberty (Article 7), and the right to privacy, dignity, and honor (Article 11), as well as Articles 8
and 9 of the Convention of Beldm do Pard. Id. 6.
91. The victims were represented before the Inter-American Court by the Asociacidn
Nacional de Abogados Democrdticos AC, the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the
Defense of Women's Rights (CLADEM), the Red Ciudadana de No Violencia y por la Dignidad
Humana, and the Centro para el Desarrollo Integral de la Mujer AC. See id. f9[ 306-07.
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members in September and October 2001, and their bodies were found
days or weeks later in a cotton field-campo algodonero-with signs of
sexual abuse and other forms of ill-treatment. 9 2 They argued that the
authorities committed a series of irregularities and delays in promptly
investigating the disappearance and murder of the three victims resulting
in the impunity of these crimes.93 They alleged that the public officials
in charge did not consider the search and investigation of these crimes a
priority due to the sex of the victims and "value judgments" related to
their conduct. 94
Two key features of the Commission and the representatives' alle-
gations were that these three cases exemplified and were part of a pat-
tern in Ciudad Juirez of disappearances and murders of women since
1993, often joined by omissions and irregularities by the State authori-
ties in the investigation and sanction of most of these cases since the
victims were women, which had fostered impunity and the repetition of
these acts.95 The Commission and the petitioners also argued that the
family members of the victims were constantly mistreated, harassed, and
intimidated by the authorities when they tried to launch and collaborate
with the investigations.96
In its judgment of November 16, 2009,9" the Court held the State
responsible for several violations under the American Convention and
the Convention of Bel6m do ParA committed to the detriment of the
three victims and their family members.98 Foremost was the failure of
the State to generally guarantee human rights by not acting with the due
92. Id. j 68-138; Cotton Field, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, (M 2-4 (Nov. 16, 2009).
93. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, H 139-251; Cotton Field, U 2-4.
94. Id.
95. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note II, H 139-53; Cotton Field, 2-4.
96. Application (Cases 12.496-12.498), supra note 11, H 239-51; Cotton Field, 413-21.
97. Cotton Field, 1.
98. Within this framework, the Court found several violations of the American Convention to
the detriment of the three victims, including the obligation to guarantee rights under Article 1.1,
the duty to adopt the legal measures necessary to implement the rights in the Convention provided
for by Article 2, the right to life protected by Article 4.1, the right to humane treatment
encompassed by Articles 5.1 and 5.2, the right to personal liberty under Article 7.1, and Articles
7(b) and 7(c) of the Convention of Belim do Pard. The Court also found violations of the rights of
the child of Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Mondrrez under Article 19 of
the American Convention. In regards to the family members of the victims, the Court found
violations of their right to access to justice and to judicial protection under Articles 8.1 and 25.1 of
the American Convention, in connection with Articles 1.1 and 2 of said instrument; their right to
personal integrity and humane treatment under Articles 5.1 and 5.2, in connection with Article
1.1; and Articles 7(b) and (c) of the Convention of Beldm do Pard. Id. 602 (4-9). The Court did
not find violations arising from the obligation of the State to respect rights under Article 1.1 of the
American Convention and the right to privacy, honor, and dignity embodied in Article 11 of the
American Convention. Id. 602 (3, 10).
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diligence necessary to protect the rights to life, to humane treatment, to
personal liberty, and to live free from violence of the three victims, and
to adequately and effectively investigate their disappearances and homi-
cides." The Court also found violations of the right not to discriminate
against women on the basis of their sex, the rights of the children of the
two victims who were minors, and the rights to humane treatment and
access to justice of the family members of the deceased."
B. Inds Ferndndez Ortega et al. v. Mexico
On May 7, 2009, the Inter-American Commission presented an
application before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights alleging
that the State of Mexico was responsible for the rape and torture of In6s
Fernindez Ortega in the State of Guerrero.' 0 The victim at issue in this
case was an indigenous woman, a member of the Me'phaa (Tlapanec)
people, and twenty-seven years old at the time of the events subject to
the application.o 2
In essence, the Commission"os and the representatives0'4 argued
before the Court that In6s Ferndndez Ortega was raped at the hands of
members of the Mexican Army at her home on March 22, 2002.105 With
the help of defense counsel and an interpreter she reported the rape
99. Id. 413-21, 286, 293.
100. Id. 602 (6-10)
101. Application (Cases 12.580), supra note 11, 1.
102. Id. 1 44.
103. The Commission argued that the State had violated the following dispositions of the
American Convention to the detriment of Inds Ferndndez Ortega: the right to humane treatment
embodied in Article 5; the right to a fair trial under Article 8; the right to privacy established in
Article 11; and the right to judicial protection under Article 25, "in conjunction with the general
obligation" to respect and ensure human rights established in Article 1.1. It also sustained
violations of Article 7 of the Convention of Beldm do Pard and Articles 1, 6, and 8 of that
instrument. The Commission also alleged that the Mexican State was responsible for violations of
the right to humane treatment under Article 5, the right to a fair trial embodied in Article 8, and
the right to judicial protection under Article 25, in relation with Article 1.1 of the Convention,
with respect to several members of Ferndndez Ortega's family: Fortunato Prisciliano Sierra (her
husband); Noemf, Ana Luz, Colosio, N6lida, and Neptalf Prisciliano Ferndndez (her children);
Marfa Lidia Ortega (her mother); and Lorenzo and Ocotlin FernAndez Ortega (her brothers). See
id. 5 (a-d).
104. The Organization of the Tlapanec/Me'phaa Indigenous Peoples, AC, the Tlachinollan
Mountain Human Rights Center, and the Center for Justice and International Law were the
representatives before the Court in this case. It is important to note that the representatives
additionally argued before the Court that the State had also violated other rights under the
American Convention: the adoption of legislative or other measures that may be necessary to give
effect to the rights contained in said instrument under Article 2; the right to freedom of association
under Article 16; and the right to equality before the law under Article 24. See Ferndndez Ortega
v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 215, 4 (Aug. 30, 2010).
105. Id. 1 55.
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before the authorities on March 24, 2002.106 The Commission and the
representatives sustained that even though the victim reported these acts
before the authorities, they failed to act with the due diligence necessary
to investigate and sanction the military officers responsible.' 0 7 Moreo-
ver, they argued that several forms of discrimination had been commit-
ted against the victim on account of her sex, race, and socioeconomic
status by the different State authorities involved in the investigation of
these acts and in the collection of evidence. 108 They overall highlighted
the particular challenges that indigenous women face to have adequate
and effective access to justice when they are victims of sexual
violence. 109
As context to their claims, both the Commission and the representa-
tives also alleged that this case exemplified the abuses committed
against the indigenous population by the military presence in the State of
Guerrero."'o They underscored in particular the use of rape as a form of
torture against the Me'phaa indigenous women and the impunity sur-
rounding such incidents."' This form of impunity, in turn, was com-
pounded by the involvement of the military justice system in the
investigation and prosecution of these crimes, a system devoid of the
impartiality necessary to investigate human rights violations. 112
The Court found the State responsible for several violations under
the American Convention to the detriment of Inds Ferndndez Ortega,
including her rights to personal integrity; dignity and privacy; judicial
protection and guarantees; and access to justice without discrimina-
tion." The Court also found a violation of her right to live free from
106. Id. R 55, 58.
107. Application (Case 12.580), supra note 11, 2.
108. Id. -H 178-79.
109. Id.
110. Id. 1 4, 40.
111. Id. 4. The Court noted that these abuses occurring against the indigenous population had
been well documented by international organizations such as Amnesty International, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of
Indigenous People, and the World Organization Against Torture. Id. 1$ 51-52, 54.
112. Id.
113. The Court found several violations of the rights contained in the American Convention to
the detriment of In6s Fernindez Ortega. These included the right to personal integrity, dignity, and
privacy established in Articles 5.1, 5.2, 11.1, and 11.2, in relation to Article 1.1 of the same
instrument; Articles 1, 2, and 6 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture;
and Article 7(a) of the Convention of Beldm do Pard. The Court also found violations of the rights
to judicial protection and guarantees established under Articles 8.1 and 25.1 of the American
Convention, in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of said instrument, and Article 7(b) of the Convention
of Beldm do Pard to the detriment of Inds Fermndez Ortega. The Court also held that the State had
failed to guarantee access to justice without discrimination to In6s Femndez Ortega under
Articles 8.1 and 25.1 of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1.1 of said instrument.
The Court finally found violations to the right to personal integrity established in Article 5.1, in
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violence under the Convention of Beldm do Pard and held that the rape
she suffered at the hands of military officials amounted to torture under
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture."' The
Court also found a violation of the right to personal integrity and to be
free from abusive and arbitrary interferences in the home of Inds Fernin-
dez Ortega, her husband, and her children. 15
C. Valentina Rosendo Canti and other v. Mexico
On August 2, 2009, the Commission presented an application
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights alleging that the State
of Mexico was responsible for the rape and torture by members of the
Mexican army of Valentina Rosendo Cantd, also in the State of Guer-
rero." 6 Valentina Rosendo Cantdi was also an indigenous woman, a
member of the Me'phaa (Tlapanec) peoples, and seventeen years old at
the time of the events. "
The Commission and the representatives alleged that Valentina
Rosendo Cantd was raped by members of the Mexican Army on Febru-
ary 16, 2002, when she left home to wash clothes in a stream. 1 ' She
filed a complaint with the authorities for the rape on March 8, 2002.9
On February 18, 2002, Valentina Rosendo Cantd went to the public
health clinic in Caxitepec for medical attention.12 0 The physician on
duty did not attend to her because he was afraid of the Army.121 On
February 26, 2002, she "went to the Central Hospital in Ayutla"-after
an eight-hour walk-"where she [did not] receive [any] medical atten-
tion either[ ] because ... she needed an appointment."122 "The next day,
[she returned] after requesting the appointment, [and] a doctor examined
her stomach and nothing else, refusing to do any other examinations
relation to Article 1.1 of said instrument, to the detriment of the husband and children of Inds
Femindez Ortega, and violations of the right to be free from arbitrary or abusive interferences
with his home under Article 11.2 to the detriment of Inds Ferndndez Ortega, her husband, and her
children. See Femndez Ortega v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, 308 (3-9) (Aug. 30, 2010).
114. Id. 308 (3-7).
115. Id. T 308 (4-6). The Court did not find violations of the right to personal integrity
established in Article 5.1 on behalf of other family members of Inds Femndez Ortega; Articles 1,
6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture; and it did not
pronounce over Article 16 of the American Convention. Id. 308 (8-9).
116. Application (Case 12.579), supra 11, 1, 33.





122. Id. T 37.
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because no female doctor was present." 2 3 As in the case of Ferndndez
Ortega, the investigation was before both the ordinary and military juris-
dictions for seven years without the identification or sanction of those
responsible. 124
The Commission1' and the representatives' 2 6 argued before the
Court that even though the victim reported these acts to the authorities,
they failed to act with the due diligence necessary to investigate and
sanction the military officers responsible.1 27 As in the case of Ferndndez
Ortega, they argued that several human rights violations under the
American Convention, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture, and the Convention of Bel6m do Pari had been commit-
ted by investigating these crimes under the military jurisdiction, and by
discriminating against the victim on the basis of her sex, race, and socio-
economic status during the investigation and evidence-collection
efforts.128 The Commission and the representatives also argued that the
denial of medical care by a public servant amounted to "an obstruction
of justice [in] . . . securing . . . evidence that would have helped identify
[the victim's] attackers."129
As in the case of Ferndndez Ortega, the Court found several viola-
123. Id.
124. Id. 1 38, 59.
125. The Commission argued that the State had violated the following dispositions of the
American Convention to the detriment to Valentina Rosendo Cantri: the right to judicial protection
and guarantees under Articles 8.1 and 25 of the American Convention, the right to humane
treatment under Article 5.1, the right to privacy under Article 11, and the rights of the child under
Article 19, in conjunction with the obligation of respecting and ensuring human rights enshrined
in Article 1.1 of said instrument; Article 7 of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard; and Articles 1, 6,
and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. The Commission also
sustained that the Mexican State was responsible for violations of the right to humane treatment
under Article 5.1, in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the American Convention, with respect to the
daughter of Valentina Rosendo Cantd. See id. 5 (a-e).
126. The Organization of the Tlapanec/Me'phaa Indigenous People, A.C., the Tlachinollan
Mountain Human Rights Center, and the Center for Justice and International Law were the
representatives of the victims in this case before the Court. The representatives "coincided
substantially with the violations alleged by the Inter-American Commission" and additionally
argued the violation of Article 5 (the right to personal integrity), Article 11 (protection of honor
and dignity), Article 8 (judicial guarantees), and Article 25 (judicial protection) of the American
Convention, to the detriment of the family members of Valentina Rosendo Cantti; Article 24
(equality before the law), and of Article 2 (obligation to adopt legislative and other measures that
may be necessary to give effect to the rights contained in the American Convention), in relation to
Articles 8 and 25 of the American Convention, Articles 1, 6, and 8 of the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, and Article 7 of the Convention of Beldm do Pard, to
the detriment of Valentina Rosendo Cantd. See Rosendo Canti v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, $ 4 (Aug. 31,
2010).
127. Application (Case 12.579), supra note I1, 2.
128. Id. 5 (a-e).
129. Id. I ll.
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tions of the American Convention to the detriment of Valentina Rosendo
Cantii, including her rights to personal integrity; to dignity and privacy;
to judicial protection and guarantees; to access to justice without dis-
crimination; and to special protection as a child.' 0 The Court also found
a violation of her right to live free from violence under the Convention
of Belim do Pari and held that the rape she suffered at the hands of
military officials amounted to torture under the Inter-American Conven-
tion to Prevent and Punish Torture."' The Court also found a violation
of the right to personal integrity in relation to Valentina Rosendo
Cantil's daughter, for the consequences she suffered due to the events.132
IV. LEGACY OF INTER-AMERICAN COURT JUDGMENTS OF COTTON
FIELD, FERNANDEZ ORTEGA, AND ROSENDO CANTO
The author suggests that these three judgments constitute both a
culmination and beginning for the inter-American system of human
rights in four key areas related to the protection of the rights of women:
violence, discrimination, due diligence, and access to justice.
On the one hand, they solidify legal principles advanced for years
by the Inter-American Commission and other international human
rights-monitoring bodies over the gravity of the problems of discrimina-
tion and violence against women and the content of the State duties to
act with due diligence toward these acts. On the other hand, they present
a series of innovative and landmark principles for the inter-American
system in the fields of due diligence, access to justice, and reparations
for victims and their family members in cases of violence and discrimi-
nation against women.
130. The Court found a number of violations of the American Convention to the detriment of
Valentina Rosendo Canti under the right to personal integrity (Articles 5.1 and 5.2) and the rights
to dignity and privacy (Articles 11.1 and 11.2), in relation to Article 1.1 of the same instrument,
and Articles 1, 2, and 6 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. The
Court also found violations of Articles 7(a) and 7(b) of the Convention of Beldm do Pard and the
rights of the child under Article 19 of the American Convention on behalf of Valentina Rosendo
Cantd. The Court also deemed the State responsible for violation of the rights to judicial
protection and guarantees (Articles 8.1 and 25.1) in relation to Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American
Convention, and the right to guarantee without discrimination the right to access to justice
established in the same dispositions, in conjunction with Article 1.1 of the same. The State was
also held responsible for the violation of the right to personal integrity of Valentina Rosendo
Cantd's daughter under Article 5.1 of the American Convention, in connection with Article 1.1 of
the same instrument. The Court did not pronounce over the alleged violation of the right to
personal integrity established in Article 5.1 of the American Convention to the detriment of other
family members of the victim and did not find the State responsible for the violation of Articles 1,
6, and 8 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. See Rosendo Canti,
295 (3-8).
131. Id. 89-121, 127-31, 183-85.
132. Id. 137-39.
2011]1 841
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
In this section, the author analyzes the main contributions of these
judgments to the development of women's rights standards in the inter-
American system of human rights in three parts: (1) analysis related to
the problem of violence against women; (2) findings related to the link
between the problems of violence and discrimination against women;
and (3) the State obligations to act with due diligence and to guarantee
adequate and effective access to justice.
A. Violence Against Women
In regards to the problem of violence against women specifically,
the three judgments make important pronouncements related to (1) the
competency of the Court to review claims under the Convention of
Bel6m do Pard and its relationship with the more general instruments
that govern the inter-American system of human rights; (2) the defini-
tion of "violence against women" under the Convention of Bel6m do
Pard; (3) the implications of the problem of rape for the victim, her fam-
ily, and her surrounding community; (4) the legal characterization of
rape as a human rights violation when perpetrated by public officials;
and (5) the enhanced nature of the State obligations related to due dili-
gence and access to justice when the victims are at risk of human rights
violations on the basis of multiple factors, such as their age, race, and
ethnicity, among others.
First, the Court in the Cotton Field judgment confirms that it is
competent to review claims and find violations under Article 7 of the
Convention of Beldm do Pard, which was questioned by the State of
Mexico during the proceedings."' By confirming that it has such juris-
diction, the Court opens an important door for future petitions alleging
human rights violations with gender-specific causes, particularly in the
realm of violence against women. The Court also begins analyzing the
relationship between Article 7 of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard and
the general rights contained in the American Convention; namely, the
rights to judicial protection and the guarantees enshrined in Articles 8.1
and 25.1.' It is important to note that the Court continued this trend in
the cases of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd by finding violations
of Articles 7(a) and 7(b) of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard and by
shedding light on the link between the obligations contained in that
instrument and in the American Convention. 3 5
133. See Cotton Field, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, 77 (Nov. 16, 2009). The Court, however, did hold that it does not
have jurisdiction to examine alleged violations of Articles 8 and 9 of said instrument, although
they can be used to interpret the provisions of Article 7. Id 79.
134. See id. U 287-389.
135. See Ferndndez Ortega, IN 192, 190-98 (Aug. 30, 2010); Rosendo Cantd, M 174-82. A
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The Court in the Cotton Field judgment also discusses what consti-
tutes "violence against women" under the Convention of Bel6m do Pard
and the scope of the obligations contained in said instrument to prevent
and respond to this acute human rights problem.' 36 The Court reiterates
its finding "that not all human right[s] violation[s] committed against a
woman [necessarily imply] a violation of the provisions" of said Con-
vention.' In this case, the Court did conclude that the three victims all
suffered violence against women and that their murders were gender-
based by considering several factors, thereby taking a step further in the
clarification of the content of this legal term within the Convention.' 3 8
The Court builds on the Cotton Field analysis relative to violence
against women in the cases of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantti
focusing in particular on the problem of rape. The Court-expanding on
its pronouncements in the case of Miguel Castro Castro Prison-refers
to rape as a paradigmatic form of violence with consequences that tran-
scend the person of the victim.' It describes rape as a form of violence
that affects all social sectors independent of class, race, ethnic group, or
level of income, along the lines of the preamble of the Convention of
Bel6m do Pard.14 0 The Court goes as far as holding that rape has multi-
ple effects and interferes in intimate zones related to the private life of a
woman, including her values, sexual life, and the ability to adopt free
decisions, all in violation of Article 11 of the American Convention.141
Indigenous women are identified as a group at particular risk of rape,
especially in zones with a strong military presence, such as Guerrero.142
judgment that also reflects this trend of interpretation by the Court is the one issued in the case of
"Las Dos Erres" Massacre v. Guatemala, where it found "the State responsible for violation of"
the right to a fair trial and judicial protection established in Articles 8.1 and 25.1 of the American
Convention, "in relation to Article 1. 1 thereof," as well as "the obligations established in Articles
1, 6, and 8" of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, and Article 7(b) of
the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence
against Women, "to the detriment of the 155 victims" in the case. See "Las Dos Erres" Massacre
v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 211 1 69-154 (Nov. 24, 2009).
136. Cotton Field, 9 226-31.
137. Id. 227.
138. Id. 228-31. The Court considered as factors: (1) that the State had recognized before
the Court both the gravity of the problem of violence against women and the influence of a
"culture of discrimination" in Ciudad Judrez; (2) reports from international bodies and non-
governmental organizations indicating that many of these murders were manifestations of gender-
based violence; (3) that in this case the victims were young, socioeconomically disadvantaged
women, who were workers or students, as many of the victims were in this context; and (4) that
the evidentiary record demonstrated that the victims had all suffered forms of ill-treatment and
probably sexual abuse before they were murdered. Id.
139. Ferndndez Ortega, 9 119; Rosendo Cantd, 9 109.
140. Ferndndez Ortega, 9 118; Rosendo Cantd, 9 108.
141. Ferndndez Ortega, 1 129; Rosendo Cantd, 9 119.
142. See, e.g., Ferndndez Ortega, 9 79; Rosendo Cantti, 171. The Court also begins analyzing
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Following the precedent of the Commission and of the universal
system of human rights, the Court emphatically finds that the rape com-
mitted against Inds Fernndez Ortega and Valentina Rosendo Cantd by
members of the Mexican military amounted to torture.14 3 The Court
applies its three-part test for torture"' to rule that rape can constitute
torture even when it consists only of an isolated occurrence or when it
occurs outside of public institutions, such as in the home of the vic-
tim.145 In analyzing the element of severe physical or mental suffering,
the Court also establishes-following the Commission in its allega-
tions-that the severe suffering of the victim is inherent to a rape, even
when there is no evidence of physical injuries or illnesses."' 6
One important contribution of the three judgments is that the Court
solidifies what the Commission and the international system of human
rights have been stating for years about the reinforced obligation of
States to respect and ensure the human rights of groups of women at
particular risk to their human rights violations, such as girls and indige-
nous women.147 The Court in its Cotton Field judgment recognizes that
the State had the obligation to adopt all the positive measures necessary
to guarantee the rights of girls, within a context of known disappear-
ances, because they comprise a group at particular risk to human rights
violations.' 8 Accordingly, the Court found that the "State violated the
the effects of rape not only on the victim, but also on her family, finding violations of Article 5.1
on behalf of Inds Fernindez Ortega's husband and children, and on behalf of Valentina Rosendo
Canti's daughter. See Ferndndez Ortega, 143-49; Rosendo Cantd, IT 138-39.
143. Ferndndez Ortega, 100-31; Rosendo Cantd, In 89-121.
144. The Court in the case of Bueno-Alves v. Argentina established a three-part test to
configure an act of torture, in line with the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Torture: (1) the act is intentional; (2) it causes severe physical and mental
suffering; and (3) it is committed with a purpose. See Ferndndez Ortega, T 120; Rosendo Cantd,
110 (both citing Bueno-Alves v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 164, T 79 (May II, 2007)).
145. Ferndndez Ortega, 128; Rosendo Cantd, 118 (citing U. N. Comm. Against Torture,
Commc'n No. 262/2005: V.L. v. Switzerland, 8.10, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/37/D/262/2005 (Jan. 22,
2007)).
146. Ferndndez Ortega, 124; Rosendo Cantd, 114.
147. Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, supra note 10,
195-97; Violence and Discrimination Against Women in the Armed Conflict in Colombia,
supra note 13, U 102-06; IACHR, Report on the Rights of Women in Haiti to Be Free from
Violence and Discrimination, OEA/Ser.L.fVIII, Doc. 64, (Mar. 10, 2009), 90; Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 25: Temporary Special
Measures, § 2, 12, U.N. Doc./CEDAW/C/2004/1/WP.1/Rev.1 (2004); Human Rights Council
Res. 14, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 14th Sess., 10, A/HRC/14/L.9/Rev.1 (June 16,
2010).
148. Cotton Field, 403-11. Even though the State had adopted legislation and policies to
protect children, the Court found, based on the evidentiary record, that these did not translate "into
effective measures for initiating a prompt search, activating all resources to mobilize the different
institutions and to deploy domestic mechanisms to obtain information to locate the girls rapidly
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right embodied in Article 19 of the Convention, in relation to Articles
1(1) and 2 thereof, to the detriment of the girls Esmeralda Herrera
Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Mondrrez."l4 9 Similarly, in the case
of Rosendo Cantd, where the victim was seventeen years old at the time
of the rape, the Court emphasized that the State had an obligation to
conduct a serious and effective investigation as soon as it knew that the
sexual violence had been committed against a person, putting her at par-
ticular risk for human rights violations.'
B. Violence and Discrimination Against Women
It is important to note that the three judgments reiterate the link
between discrimination and violence against women, construing vio-
lence as a form of discrimination and following the precedent of the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
("CEDAW").m' They also explore the negative influence of discrimina-
tion on the actions of public officials entrusted with the investigation of
acts of violence against women. 152
Applying the precedent of the Inter-American System of Human
Rights and the landmark case of Opuz v. Turkey15 3 from the European
Court of Human Rights, the Court in Cotton Field finds a violation of
the general obligation not to discriminate encompassed in Article 1(1) of
the American Convention.154 The Court concludes that the comments
made by public officials to family members when they reported the dis-
appearance of the three victims implying that they had gone off with
their boyfriends or that they led a "disreputable life," and the use of
questions about their sexual preference, constituted stereotyping5 and a
and, once their bodies were found, to conduct the investigations and prosecute and punish those
responsible effectively and promptly." Id T 410.
149. Id. 1411.
150. Rosendo Canti, 103. The Court reiterated its line of reasoning about the duty of states to
safeguard the best interests of the child with special measures of guarantee and care, and also
listed some of the contents of this reinforced obligation referencing the general observations of the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, including (1) to adapt existing procedures and related
information to the specific needs of young women; (2) to guarantee the right of children who have
been sexually abused to be adequately heard in procedures that relate to them in a secure and non-
intimidating environment; and (3) to guarantee that children are not interrogated more than
necessary to prevent their revictimization or trauma. Id. 201.
151, Cotton Field, H 395, 402; Ferndndez Ortega, 130; Rosendo Canti, 120.
152. Cotton Field, U 208, 401; Ferndndez Ortega, 197; Rosendo Cantdi, 1 181.
153. Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009).
154. Cotton Field, I9 201, 408.
155. The Court found that "gender stereotyping refers to a preconception of personal attributes,
characteristics or roles that correspond or should correspond to either men or women," which can
be reflected in the policies, practices, and language of judicial and police authorities, as it was in
this case. Id. $ 401.
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form of discrimination. 5 6 The Court, moreover, found that both the atti-
tude and the statements of officials revealed that, at the very least, they
were indifferent toward the family members of the victims and their
reports.'5 7 The analysis highlights that the use of stereotypes can be both
a cause and a consequence of gender-based violence against women.'
In the cases of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd, the Court
discussed under the general obligation to respect, under Article 1.1 of
the American Convention, factors that render the indigenous population
more at risk for human rights violations by the administration of justice
and the health system.159 The Court referred to factors such as speaking
a different language, not having access to interpreters, and the lack of
economic resources to retain an attorney, among others.1 60 This pro-
duces an avid mistrust in the justice system and other public instances of
protection.1 6' For indigenous women, the Court considers that these bar-
riers are particularly acute since they may also face the rejection and
ostracism of their communities when they denounce crimes.' 62
Therefore, the Court in Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd reit-
erates this line of jurisprudence, holding that to duly guarantee access to
justice to members of indigenous communities under Article 1.1 of the
American Convention, states need to adopt protection measures taking
into account their particularities, social and economic characteristics,
their special situation of vulnerability, their laws, their values, and their
customs. 16 3 The Court highlights in particular in the case of Ferndndez
Ortega the impossibility of the victim to file a complaint and to receive
information in her own language." In the case of Rosendo Cantd, the
Court notes that the State did not provide the victim with an interpreter
when she requested medical attention and when she presented her initial
complaint, and that she did not receive information in her own language
related to the processing of her complaint.'6 5 The Court also emphasizes
the duty to abstain from direct and indirect discrimination.16 6
156. Id. 208.
157. Id. 400.
158. Id. 401. The Court, moreover, noted the conclusions of various reports discussing how
the crimes in Ciudad Judrez are related to gender violence, which "occurs in a context of
systematic discrimination against women," and that sexual violence cases presented higher levels
of impunity, which fueled their perpetuation and repetition. Id. IN 133, 161.




163. Ferndndez Ortega, 200; Rosendo Cantd, 184.
164. Ferndndez Ortega, 201.
165. Rosendo Cantd, 185.
166. Ferndndez Ortega, J 200.
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C. Due Diligence and Access to Justice
The Cotton Field judgment greatly contributes to the clarification
of the scope and content of the concrete responsibilities of states in indi-
vidual cases of violence and discrimination against women, especially
when these acts are presumably perpetrated by private individuals. It
provides an invaluable contribution to the progressive efforts by differ-
ent international legal bodies,'17 and the inter-American system of
human rights, to define the scope and content of the due diligence obli-
gation in cases of violence against women, as well as the link between
due diligence and access to justice.
Within the framework of the general obligation to guarantee human
rights under Article 1.1 of the American Convention,16 8 the Court in
Cotton Field delves comprehensively into the content of the obligation
of states to act with the due diligence necessary to prevent, investigate,
sanction, and offer reparations in cases of violence against women and
discrimination, particularly those that take place amidst a context of high
numbers of acts of violence against women typically left unresolved and
in impunity by states.16 9 The Court performs this analysis, referring to
the provisions of the American Convention, the Convention of Belim do
Pard, the Commission case of Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Bra-
167. See, e.g., Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); U.N. Econ. & Soc.,
Comm. on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its
Causes and Consequences, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006); U.N. Comm.
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 19, Violence
Against Women, 84, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1994); Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Views Under Article 7(3) of the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/39/D/6/2005 (Oct. 1, 2007); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Views of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women Under Article 7(3) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/39/D/5/2005 (Aug. 6,
2007); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Views of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women under Article 7(3) of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, annex II, Comm. No. 2/2003 (2003).
168. The Court has previously established that this obligation refers to the duty of the states to
organize the entire government apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public
authority is exercised, so that they are able to ensure the free and full exercise of human rights.
See, e.g., Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4,
166 (July 29, 1988); Kawas-FernAndez v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 196, 137 (Apr. 3, 2009); Anzualdo Castro v. Peru, Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 202, 62
(Sept. 22, 2009).
169. See generally Cotton Field.
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zil,'o its own cases,"' and leading international precedent and reports
on the subject from international and human rights monitoring bodies
and mechanisms.17 2
The analysis of the Court in Cotton Field is particularly noteworthy
in the realms of prevention, investigation, and reparations from the per-
spective of gender-based violence and discrimination. In regard to pre-
vention, the Court underscores that even though this is an obligation of
means and not results, the duty is still comprehensive, encompassing the
adoption of legal, public policy, and institutional measures designed to
prevent these acts and to ultimately protect women from risk factors that
increase their exposure to violence.173 Even though the Court reiterates
its precedent about the limited responsibility of the State for human
rights violations committed by private individuals, and the requirement
of knowledge of a situation of real and immediate danger in order to
incur liability,17 1 the Court specifically refers to an obligation of "strict
due diligence" that arises in regard to reports of missing women in a
known context of disappearances and murders, with respect to search
operations during the first hours and days.' 7  As noted earlier, the Court
underscores that this obligation is particularly important in the case of
girls reported as missing.617
In regards to the State's obligation to investigate, the Court in Cot-
ton Field for the first time establishes that performing a prompt, serious,
impartial, and exhaustive investigation of human rights violations has a
"wider scope" when dealing with the case of a woman who is killed, ill-
treated, or whose personal liberty is affected within the framework of a
general context of violence against women.177 Consequently, the Court
170. See Da Penha Maia Fernandes v. Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 54/01, OEA/Ser./LJV/I.111, doc. 20 rev. (2001).
171. See, e.g., Cotton Field, 397.
172. Among these, the Court refers to reports and decisions from the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, the National Commission
on Human Rights of Mexico, United Nations Special Rapporteurs, the CEDAW Committee, and
Amnesty International, among other national and international nongovernmental human rights
organizations and mechanisms. See, e.g, id. if 113--64, 390-402.
173. Id. 1 242-58.
174. See id. 280 (citing Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, 123 (Jan. 31, 2006) (relying on Kilig v. Turkey,
App. No. 22492/93, 62-63 (Eur. Comm'n H.R 2000) and Osman v. United Kingdom, 1998-VII
Eur. Ct. H.R., 115-16)).
175. The Court states that the obligation of "strict due diligence" when a women is reported
missing in a context of serious acts of violence against women requires that police authorities,
prosecutors and judicial officials take immediate and prompt actions by ordering the necessary
measures to determine the whereabouts of the victims and to perform an effective investigation
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confirms the existence of far-reaching irregularities in the investigation
of the three cases, which have hardly been rectified, and verifies the
failure of the State to investigate and sanction the public officials
responsible for these irregularities, all within a context of judicial inef-
fectiveness that sends a social message that violence against women is
tolerated and promotes its repetition."'
In the same line of reasoning, the Cotton Field judgment marks the
first time the Court addresses what reparations should be from a gender
perspective for victims of acts of discrimination and violence against
women in the fields of satisfaction, rehabilitation, guarantees of non-
repetition, and compensation."" Among its most significant aspects, the
Court innovatively adds a component to the traditional integral repara-
tion scheme-"rectification"-which should be present in cases of sys-
temic and structural discrimination against women, since "restitution"
and a pure reestablishment to the previous situation will not be sufficient
for lasting change.18 0 Moreover, in the sphere of investigation, the Court
highlights the negative and positive obligations of the State in cases of
violence against women, including the obligation to remove all factual
and juridical obstacles to the due investigation of the facts and the con-
duct of the proceedings and also to ensure that investigations have a
gender perspective. 18' In regard to women who have disappeared, one of
the most noteworthy measures ordered by the Court is the creation, or
updating, of a national database to facilitate the identification of women
reported as missing.' 82
As a corollary to the State's obligation to act with due diligence,
the Court in Cotton Field also delves in detail into the obligation of
states to guarantee adequate access to justice to victims and their family
members in order to obtain a remedy for cases of violence against
women and discrimination.'" In the ruling, the Court finds that the suf-
fering of the family members due to the circumstances of the deaths of
their daughters and the obstacles they faced in the pursuit of justice
amounted not only to a violation of the right to personal integrity under




181. The Court defines an investigation from a gender perspective as one including specific
lines of inquiry related to sexual violence, one conducted in accordance with protocols and
manuals that conform to human rights standards, where the victims' family members can access
information and case files regularly, and one that is conducted by officials that are highly trained
in addressing discrimination and gender-based violence, among other considerations. Id. I 455(b).
182. Id. 512.
183. Id. 9H 412-40.
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degrading treatment under Article 5.2.184 Even though the Court has
repeatedly established that the family members of the victims of human
rights violations may also be victims under Article 5.1 of the American
Convention, due to the consequences of the violations perpetrated
against their loved ones, the finding of the Court under Article 5.2
reflects the gravity the Court perceived in the mistreatment by the
authorities of the family members throughout the investigation pro-
cess.'8 5 The Court went as far as to find a pattern of state conduct
toward the family members and representatives of the victims of vio-
lence in Ciudad Juirez, including "depreciatory, disrespectful, and even
aggressive treatment" when they sought information on the progress of
the investigations,18 6 which resulted in an avid mistrust and fear of the
authorities, and repeated acts of harassments.
The Court in Rosendo Canti and Ferndndez Ortega builds on the
precedent of the case of Cotton Field by shedding light on the content of
the obligation to act with due diligence and to guarantee adequate and
effective access to justice in cases of rape.
Some of the most important analysis in these judgments is related
to the comprehensive proof that must be assessed in the case of a
rape.' The Court highlights the value of the declaration of the victim
and of psychological evidence as important proof to weigh in a case of
rape-two types of proof often neglected in cases of rape.' The Court
construes the declaration of a victim as crucial in a case of rape due to
the nature of the acts and the absence of witnesses, even in the presence
of inconsistencies.' 8 9  Following international precedent, the Court
underscores that evidence of physical resistance is not required to prove
a rape, especially when the acts are committed in an environment of
184. Id. 440.
185. Id. IT 412-40.
186. Id. 435.
187. In the analysis of the credibility of the declarations rendered by the victims, the Court
considered that they were indigenous women, lived in a rural mountainous zone with military
presence, had to walk several hours to file a complaint regarding sexual violence with several state
authorities who did not speak their language, which could have potential repercussions in their
communities. In the case of Valentina Rosendo Cantil, the Court also reasoned that the victim was
a child when she denounced these acts before the authorities. Therefore, the Court considers
proven-in an analysis mostly based on the declarations of both victims-that the two victims
were raped by military officials. See Ferndndez Ortega, 108, 170; Rosendo Cantd, M 93, 108.
188. Ferndndez Ortega, IN 100, 113; Rosendo Cantd, H 89, 99. For more discussion of this
issue, see Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., OEA/Ser. L.IVII. doc. 68, 136 (2007).
189. The Court considered that the victims in Rosendo Cantl and Ferndndez Ortega had
denounced the acts of rape several times, at the national level and before the inter-American
system, and that it is not uncommon that the declarations of these types of acts will contain
discrepancies due to the traumatic nature of the events, especially when interpreters are used. See
Ferndndez Ortega, 1% 100, 104-05; Rosendo Canni, %T 89-90.
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coercion.190
In the case of Rosendo Cantd in particular, it is very significant that
the Court still found the occurrence of the rape by military officials even
though the victim had not indicated during her two first medical consul-
tations that she had been raped."' The Court considered that this factor
had to be "contextualized in the circumstances of the present case and of
the victim."' 92 Therefore, the Court reasoned that rape is usually the
type of crime that the victim seldom reports, especially victims from
indigenous communities, due to the cultural and social particularities of
these communities and fear. The Court also reasoned that she was a
child at the time of the events and had received threats from the military
officers who raped her; the victim might not have felt that the safety and
trust conditions were there for her to report the rape.' 9 3
The Court in the cases of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd
also held that the investigation of acts of rape should be pursued with
determination and efficacy, considering the duty of society to reject vio-
lence against women and the obligations of states to eradicate it and to
build victims' trust in the state institutions that are entrusted with their
protection.' 94 The Court underscores the positive obligation of states to
investigate human rights violations under the American Convention and
how this is an obligation of means and not results.'95 In this analysis, the
Court highlights the complementary nature of the obligations contained
under Articles 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention and the specific
obligations established in Article 7(b) of the Convention of Beldm do
Pard, especially the duty to act with due diligence to prevent, sanction,
and eradicate violence against women.196 The Court also undertakes a
thorough analysis of the roadblocks that both In6s Fernndez Ortega and
Valentina Rosendo Cantii encountered in their attempt to access
justice. 197
190. Femdndez Ortega, 115 n.104 (citing M.C. v. Bulgaria, App. No. 39272/98 (Eur. Ct.
H.R. 2003)); Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T.
Judgment, 452, 464 (Int'l Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since
1991 Feb. 22, 2001)).
191. Rosendo Cantd, 95.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Ferndndez Ortega, 1 193; Rosendo Cantd, 177.
195. Femdndez Ortega, 191; Rosendo Cantd, 175.
196. Ferndndez Ortega, 193; Rosendo Cantu, 177.
197. In the case of Ines Ferndndez Ortega, the Court noted that (1) the victim's complaint is
initially not received by a public official at the prosecutor's office; (2) she has no access to a state
interpreter; (3) her complaint is taken in a public place without respect for the care and privacy
minimum guarantees that a victim of sexual violence needs; 4) the investigation of the scene of
the crime is not performed until 12 days later; and 5) she does not receive adequate psychological
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At different places in the opinion in Ferndndez Ortega, the Court
also discusses how the laboratory proof was not duly protected, which
contributed to the impunity of the rape.'18 The Court notes with dismay
the unexplained disposal of the laboratory tests taken from In6s Fernin-
dez Ortega, which revealed the presence of semen; negligence which
impeded the realization of key tests, resulting in the lack of clarification
of the events.' 99
The Court also takes advantage of the opportunity in the judgments
of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd to highlight how, in cases of
rape, the investigation should prevent the revictimization and reliving of
the profound traumatic experience for the victim.2 00 The Court observes
how most of the authorities in charge of the investigation centered their
efforts on inciting In6s Fernindez Ortega and Valentina Rosendo Cantd
to declare repeatedly, instead of trying to collect other types of proof.2 0'
The Court also notes the lack of will, sensibility, and capacity of the
various public officials that initially intervened in the complaints filed
by In6s Fernndez Ortega and Valentina Rosendo Cantil, as well as the
absence of a protocol of action by officials in the health sector for these
kinds of cases.20 2
In the realm of access to justice, the Court also reiterates in the
Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd judgments that the military juris-
diction should have a restrictive and exceptional scope, and is not a
competent forum to judge and sanction perpetrators of human rights vio-
lations, such as sexual violence.2 03 In its reasoning, the Court highlights
that the victims should have had at their disposal an adequate and effec-
tive recourse for challenging the military jurisdiction over the judgment
of sexual violence crimes, in accordance with Article 25.1 of the Ameri-
can Convention. 204
and medical attention. Ferndndez Ortega, 16-18, 190, 195. In the case of Valentina Rosendo
Cantd, the Court similarly noted that (1) the state became aware of the events before the formal
complaint was filed by the victim on March 8, 2002, but did not immediately begin the
investigation and did not offer the victim the needed medical attention; (2) a public official from
the prosecutor's office made difficult the interposition of the complaint; (3) she did not have the
support of a state interpreter; (4) her complaint was filed in a public space; (5) there is no evidence
indicating that the public officials collected all the necessary elements of proof; (6) she did not
have the required medical and psychological attention during the processing of the case; and (7)
the investigations were archived for three years and ten months. Rosendo Cantd, 16-18, 23,
179.
198. Ferndndez Ortega, 112, 195 (vi).
199. Id.
200. Id. 196; Rosendo Cantd, 180.
201. Id.
202. Ferndndez Ortega, J 197; Rosendo Cantl, 181.
203. Ferndndez Ortega, 177; Rosendo Cant, 161.
204. Ferndndez Ortega, 182-83; Rosendo Canal, 9 166-67.
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In the realm of reparations, the Court in Rosendo Cantd and Fer-
ndndez Ortega also made some important pronouncements. The Court
held emphatically that reparations should take into account that the vic-
tims were indigenous women and highlighted that measures with com-
munity reach might be necessary in their case.2 05 The Court also held
that the State should adopt measures, from an indigenous and gender
perspective, to ensure that indigenous women can participate in the
processing of their cases. 2 0 6 The Court also reiterates the need to imple-
ment capacity-building programs to enhance the investigation of sexual
violence cases, from an ethnic and gender perspective, and to continue
the standardization process of protocols pertaining to the investigation of
sexual violence cases.207
V. OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN STANDARD-SETTING FOR THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The author suggests in this article that a key part of the legacy of
the Court judgments in the cases of Cotton Field, Ferndndez Ortega,
and Rosendo Cantd is that they provide both a set of opportunities and
challenges to the inter-American system of human rights in the develop-
ment of legal standards related to the human rights of women. In this
section, the author analyzes four opportunities and four challenges
presented by these judgments in the standard setting.
A. Opportunities
The author considers that the three judgments discussed in this arti-
cle provide the inter-American system four key opportunities for the
future development of human rights standards related to the rights of
women; namely, (1) to continue defining the content of cornerstone
State obligations, such as due diligence and access to justice; (2) to clar-
ify the intersection between the issues of violence, discrimination, due
diligence, and access to justice, and what this intersection means for
State compliance with their human rights obligations at the national
level; (3) to shed light on the content of Article 7 of the Convention of
Bel6m do Pard, the complementary nature of its provisions, and its
symbiotic relationship with the more general obligations contained in
the American Convention; and (4) to define the regional and interna-
tional terminology used to describe the problems of discrimination and
violence against women in a way that impacts the adoption of legislation
205. Ferndndez Ortega, 224; Rosendo Cantd, 206.
206. Rosendo Cantii, 1 213.
207. Ferndndez Ortega, 256, 259-260; Rosendo Cantii, 1 242, 249.
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and other public measures to address these problems at the national
level.
As noted earlier, one key contribution of the three judgments is in
shedding light on the content of the State's obligation to act with due
diligence when acts of violence and discrimination are perpetrated by
state and non-state actors. The due diligence standard has been widely
referenced in international law and in the field of violence against
women.2 0 8 In this analysis, the international community has been gradu-
ally shedding light on what the contents are for the four components of
the State's due diligence obligation to respond to acts of violence against
women-namely, prevention, investigation, sanction, and reparations.209
Various international legal bodies are striving to answer the question of
what it really means for a State to organize its entire structure to respond
to violence against women and its root cause, discrimination.2 10 As the
cases discussed in this article illustrate, this standard has also been
repeatedly referenced by the inter-American system of human rights as a
way of understanding what State obligations mean in application when it
comes to responding to the problem of violence against women at the
national level. Now the Court has opened a very important space to con-
tinue defining the scope and reach of the due diligence standard at both
the regional and international levels.
In the realm of prevention, it is important that both the Court and
the Commission take advantage of the analytical space that has been
opened to continue defining the reach and specifics of the due diligence
208. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the due diligence standard in international
law, see generally Jan Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution
and Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 265 (2004); Robert P.
Bamidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law, 8 INT'L CMTy. L. REV. 81
(2006); Johanna Bourke-Martignoni, The History and Development of the Due Diligence Standard
in International Law and Its Role in the Protection of Women Against Violence, in DUE DILIGENCE
AND ITs APPLICATION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE 47 (Carin Benninger-Budel ed.,
2008); Yakin Erttirk, The Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, E/CN.4/2006/61 (Jan. 20, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
pdfid/45377afb0.pdf.
209. See, e.g., United Nations General Assembly Resolution, Human Rights Council,
Accelerating Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women: Ensuring Due Diligence
in Prevention, A/HRC/14/L.9/Rev.1 (June 16, 2010), available at http://domino.un.org/unispal.
nsf/0/33f2a0a73abl85db8525773e00525d05?OpenDocument; United Nations, Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, General Assembly Resolution 48/104 (1993); United
Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General
Recommendation 19, Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1//Rev.1 (1994), 11;
United Nations, Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, Fourth World Conference on
Women, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995), It 112-26.
210. See, e.g., Opuz v. Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, 246 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Views on Comm. No. 6/2005, Fatma Yildrim
v. Austria, 12.1.1 (2004); Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Views on Comm. No. 2/2003, AT. v. Hungary, 9.2 (2003).
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obligation, identifying legal, public policy, and institutional measures
that states could implement effectively in practice. For example, more
legal analysis is needed in regard to the question of "knowledge" and
when a State knows of a situation presenting a real and immediate risk
that triggers the duty to prevent, especially when violations are commit-
ted by non-state actors. It is also necessary to delve more deeply into
what it means for a State to conduct an investigation from a gender
perspective and what the components should be for investigation proto-
cols related to violence against women. In the sphere of judgment and
sanction, future rulings can also perhaps include more in-depth analysis
and examples of how discrimination, prejudices, and stereotypes affect
the actions of public officials in every sector of the government, includ-
ing justice officials and the police; the Court will have an opportunity to
do this in the resolution of the upcoming case of Karen Atala and
Daughters.2 1 1
Hopefully, future judgments will also expand on the content of a
right to remedy when acts of violence and discrimination occur, building
on the precedent set in the Commission case of Raquel Martin de Mej(a
discussed earlier.212 The Court also now has the opportunity to offer
specific examples of reparations that can advance the goal of rectifying a
context of structural discrimination, as well as examples of collective
reparations from a gender and ethnic perspective.
At another level, the Court and the Commission have also begun to
explore the varied intersections between the issues of discrimination,
violence, due diligence, and access to justice. Both organs now have the
opportunity to continue analyzing in detail the link between the duty to
act with due diligence and the obligation of states to guarantee access to
adequate and effective judicial remedies for victims and their family
members when they suffer acts of violence.213 They also have the oppor-
tunity to explore the connection between discrimination, violence
against women, and due diligence, since the State's duty to address vio-
lence against women also involves measures to prevent and respond to
the discrimination that fuels this problem. 2 14 Both the CEDAW and
211. See generally Case of Karen Atala, supra note 76.
212. Raquel Martin de Mejia v. Peru, Case 10.970, See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Rep, No. 5/
96, OEA/Ser.L./VIII.91, doc. 7 (1996).
213. There has been some analysis regarding this connection. See Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser. LIVII. doc. 68,
V 123-216 (2007); da Penha Maia Fernandes, 36-44; United Nations General Assembly
Resolution, Intensification of Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women, AIRES/
63/155, 11, 14-16.
214. For some analysis regarding these linkages at the universal system of human rights and
the inter-American system, see Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
supra note 208, 9N 1, 11, 23; Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v. Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-
2011] 855
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Bel6m do Pard Conventions provide that states must adopt the required
measures to modify social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women and to eliminate prejudices, stereotypes, and other practices
based on the idea of the inferiority or superiority of the sexes.2 15 States
need legal insight on what concrete measures can be the most effective
to prevent and eradicate the social and cultural patterns that sustain dis-
crimination and its extreme forms.
In this sense, the Court's recognition of its competence to review
individual cases under Article 7 of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard is a
landmark for the inter-American system. It will undoubtedly increase the
avenues for victims to present and litigate cases of violence and discrim-
ination against women before the system. The Court now has the oppor-
tunity to shed light on the comprehensive and interrelated nature of the
set of obligations comprised in Article 7 of said Convention, building on
its analysis related to Articles 7(a-c) of said instrument. Another impor-
tant line of analysis to explore is the relationship between the immediate
obligations of the Convention of Bel6m do Pard contained in Article 7
and those contained in Articles 8 and 9. In the author's view, in order to
understand the Convention of Bel6m do Pard fully, all of its articles have
to be interpreted in conjunction due to the crucial nature of the immedi-
ate due diligence measures contained in Article 7, the measures geared
toward the prevention and non-repetition of these acts established in
Article 8, and the groups identified as particularly exposed to violence
under Article 9, among other key dispositions of the Convention.
The author also believes that the Court has opened a very important
line of analysis in the three mentioned judgments by emphasizing the
complementary nature of the Convention of Beldm do Pard with the
American Convention.2 16 It is noteworthy that the Court began this anal-
ysis with fundamental rights contained in the American Convention,
such as the right to life embodied in Article 4.1 and the right to judicial
protection and guarantees protected under Articles 8.1 and 25.1-para-
mount rights that are crucial for women's access to justice and for the
due diligence obligation of states. Hopefully, the organs of the system
will take advantage of this space to elaborate more on the symbiotic
Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.VJIIit.111, doc. 20 rev. 1 52 (2001); United
Nations, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, A/RES/48/104 art. 3, 4 (Feb.
23, 1994).
215. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art.
5(a), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Convention of Beldm do Pard, art. 6.
216. The text of the Convention of Belm do Pard itself establishes this link in Article 4 by
advancing that "every woman has the right to the recognition, enjoyment, exercise, and protection
of all human rights and freedoms embodied in regional and international human rights instruments
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relationship between the provisions contained in the Convention of
Bel6m do Pard and other fundamental guarantees contained in the Amer-
ican Convention relevant to the protection of the rights of women, such
as the general obligation to respect and guarantee the rights in said
instrument without discrimination under Article 1.1, the duty to adopt
domestic legal provisions to render the rights contained in the Conven-
tion a reality under Article 2, and the right to equal protection of the law
and before the law established in Article 24, among others.217
It would also be useful for the organs of the system to delve more
into the link between the Convention of Bel6m do Pard and other spe-
cialized instruments such as the Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture and the Additional Protocol to the American Con-
vention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights ("Protocol of San Salvador"), among others. The organs of the
system will surely in the future also have opportunity to continue defin-
ing the contours of the definition of "violence against women" under the
Convention of Belim do Pard in the resolution of future cases.
Finally, another relevant opportunity for the organs of the system
that these judgments provide is in the definition of legal terminology
related to violence against women and discrimination-a process impor-
tant at various levels. On the one hand, it can set a trend for the presenta-
tion of facts and allegations in future cases before the inter-American
system of human rights. On the other, it can constitute an important
reference for states in the reform and adoption of legislation and public
policies to respond to violence and discrimination against women.
The Court, in its Cotton Field judgment, interestingly started adopt-
ing its own positions on the regional and international terminology used
to describe the problems of discrimination and violence against women
and the State's response. The Court in its reasoning refers to important
terminology to describe structural and institutional discrimination, such
as "culture of discrimination," "systematic discrimination," and "stereo-
types."2 18 Additionally, even though both the Commission and the peti-
tioners had advanced the theory of a "pattern" of acts of violence against
women in the locality of Ciudad Juirez, the Court chooses to use the
word "context," a broader and largely undefined term that perhaps could
serve to fit more cases in the future that do not display the characteristics
and unifying tendencies of the phenomenon of violence in Ciudad Jud-
217. It would be interesting to see more in-depth analysis from the inter-American system
establishing the relationship between the provisions of the Convention of Beldm do Pard regarding
the human rights to personal integrity (Article 5.1), to dignity and to privacy (Articles 11.1 and
11.2), to protection of the family (Article 17.1), and economic, social and cultural rights (Article
26), among others.
218. See, e.g., Cotton Field, 1 132, 133, 164, 401.
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rez.21 9 In this analysis, at times the Court follows the international ten-
dencies in terminology and in other instances it chooses its own
modality. The author hopes that this process continues and evolves
according to the circumstances of the individual cases presented in the
future before the system and in light of international human rights law
developments.
B. Challenges
Along with the opportunities discussed above, these judgments also
exemplify the challenges a regional human rights protection system can
confront in setting standards that states can effectively and adequately
implement in practice to promote the observance of the human rights of
women in their countries. The judgments also reveal the difficulties for a
regional human rights protection system to respond to current social
conditions and the highly evolving needs in the realm of women's
rights.
Four future challenges the author observes for the inter-American
system of human rights in standard setting pertaining to the rights of
women are (1) the application of these three judgments to individual
cases where a context of discrimination and violence is not well docu-
mented; (2) the concrete definition of the link between the principles of
nondiscrimination and equality before the law contained in Articles 1.1
and 24 of the American Convention, the expansion of the legal content
of these two articles, and the setting of concrete standards in the realm of
intersectionality, as well as the multiple forms of discrimination a
woman can face on the basis of several factors; (3) the interpretation of
the findings of these cases to the resolution of individual petitions
brought under the American Declaration; and (4) the application of these
standards to issues largely unexplored by the regional system but where
acute needs exist, such as the economic, social, and cultural rights of
women.
One of the most important challenges the inter-American system
faces at the moment is to determine how to apply the contents of these
judgments to cases that do not occur in a context of violence and dis-
crimination against women as well documented as the context of Ciudad
Juirez. As noted throughout this article, a substantial part of the analysis
of the Court in the Cotton Field judgment points to the reinforced duty
of the State to adopt prompt and comprehensive measures to prevent and
investigate acts such as those that occurred to the victims because of the
well publicized context of disappearances, murders, and state negligence
219. Id. 406, 143-44.
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affecting Ciudad Juirez.2 20 In the cases of Ferndndez Ortega and
Rosendo Cantd, the Court also referred to the military presence in Guer-
rero, other documented cases of sexual violence perpetrated against
indigenous women in this zone, and reports from various international
and national entities regarding incidents of sexual violence in
Guerrero.221
While recognizing that violence against women is rarely an isolated
phenomenon, the author wonders how the organs of the system will rule
in cases where there is barely any international or national documenta-
tion of a context of violence and discrimination against women. It will
also be interesting to see how the precedent of these cases is applied to
violence against women perpetrated in different settings-such as the
home and public spaces-and in situations of armed conflict and its
aftermath; settings where the particularities of how violence is con-
ducted against women have to be taken into account in determining the
scope of State responsibility. The Court's determination of knowledge of
imminent risk in Cotton Field on the part of the authorities-for pur-
poses of the violation of the rights to life and personal integrity-is
largely premised on the existence of a documented context of violence
and discrimination in Ciudad Juirez.222 It is noteworthy, however, that
the Court in Cotton Field made a distinction between the obligation to
prevent before and the obligation after a complaint related to a disap-
pearance is filed before the authorities for purposes of State
responsibility.22 3
Another key challenge for the system is related to the concept of
"intersectionality" 224 and the multiple forms of discrimination that can
220. The Court in its legal findings relied to a great extent on numerous pronouncements from
international and national organizations verifying the facts, figures, and irregularities in the State
response to the problem of violence in this locality. Cotton Field, 121, 249-86, 287-370.
221. Ferndndez Ortega, 79; Rosendo Canti, 71.
222. Cotton Field, 283-84.
223. The Court considered that even though the State was aware of the risk to women in
Ciudad Judrez, it had not been established that it knew of a real and imminent danger for the
victims in this case before the report of their disappearances. See id. 282.
224. The CEDAW Committee has recently defined the concept of "intersectionality" as:
Intersectionality is a basic concept for understanding the scope of the general
obligations of States parties contained in Article 2. The discrimination of women
based on sex and gender is inextricably linked with other factors that affect women,
such as race, ethnicity, religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste, and sexual
orientation and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may
affect women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in different ways
than men. States parties must legally recognize and prohibit such intersecting forms
of discrimination and their compounded negative impact on the women concerned.
General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 18 CEDAW,
47th Sess., U.N. Doc C/2010/47/GC.2 (Oct. 19, 2010).
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affect women on the basis of their sex, race, ethnicity, social class, age,
sexual orientation, and gender identity, among other causes. The Com-
mission has begun exploring this issue in the resolution of individual
cases and thematic reports.2 25 The Court also delves in Ferndndez
Ortega and Rosendo Cantd into the need for a gender and indigenous
perspective in the adoption of measures designed to protect the right of
indigenous women to adequate access to justice and the grant of repara-
tions. The analysis of the Court on this issue, however, is limited to the
226 olanguage barriers the victims faced in their pursuit of justice. Two of
the aforementioned judgments-Cotton Field and Rosendo Cantd-
expand on what these measures would look like in practice for cases
involving girls, referring to an obligation to act with "strict due dili-
gence" and the special protection obligation of the State.227 The author
considers that more cases need to be presented before the inter-Ameri-
can system exemplifying multiple forms of discrimination and how the
State's duty to respect and guarantee under Article 1.1 of the American
Convention should be implemented at the national level in terms of leg-
islation, public policies, programs, and services, among other areas. New
cases can offer the opportunity to the organs of the system to develop
important concepts related to the social exclusion faced by these groups
and to report on the specific barriers they face in their pursuit of justice.
A very important challenge related to the issue of intersectionality
is the definition of the scope of the obligations of nondiscrimination and
equality before the law within the framework of the inter-American sys-
tem of human rights. This standard-setting priority is still largely in a
development phase within the inter-American system. These principles
are of utmost importance, as they are not only contained in Articles 1.1
and 24 of the American Convention, but they constitute the backbone of
the inter-American and universal systems of human rights.228 They are
225. For a discussion of this issue by the Inter-American Commission, see Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Access to Justice for Women Victims of Violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser.LN/VII., doc. 68
IN 195-97 (Jan. 20, 2007); Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Violence and Discrimination Against Women
in the Armed Conflict in Colombia, OEA/Ser.LJVIII. 124, doc.67 11 102-06 (Oct. 18, 2006);
Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R, Report on the Rights of Women in Haiti to Be Free from Violence and
Discrimination, OEA/Ser.L./VII, doc. 64 90 (Mar. 10, 2009).
226. Ferndndez Ortega, 9 199-201; Rosendo Cantd, 183-85.
227. Cotton Field, 403-11; Rosendo Cantd, 1 200-02.
228. See generally Girls Yean & Bosico v. Dominican Republic, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 130 (Sept. 8, 2005);
Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A.) No. 18 (Sept. 17, 2003); Maria Eugenia Morales de Sierra v.
Guatemala, Case 11.625, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 4/01, OEA/Ser.L./VI.111, doc.
20 (2001); United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non-discrimination
(1989); United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Non-Discrimination in
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art.2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on Economic,
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also at the core of most priority women's rights issues in the realm of
their civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.
The author considers that there are several needs right now in the
inter-American system related to the principles of nondiscrimination and
equality in order to give states clear guidelines of their obligations to
protect the rights of women at the national level. First, there is a need to
reconcile the positions of the Commission and the Court regarding the
applicability and link between the obligations of states under Articles
1.1 and 24 of the American Convention.229 Second, the author considers
that there is a need to continue discussing what the components are for
the test of strict scrutiny in cases of discrimination on the basis of sex
and the contours of the phrase "other social condition" within Article 1.1
of the American Convention. Legal developments in this sense would
open the door for the system's resolution of cases involving other forms
of discrimination that affect women beyond their sex, such as sexual
Social and Cultural Rights), Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, 42nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/
C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
229. The Court has underscored the distinction between the obligations contained in Articles
1.1 and 24 of the American Convention, holding in the case of Apitz Barbera v. Venezuela:
The difference between the two articles lies in that the general obligation contained
in Article 1.1 refers to the State's duty to respect and guarantee "nondiscrimination"
in the enjoyment of the rights enshrined in the American Convention, while Article
24 protects the right to "equal treatment before the law." In other words, if the State
discriminates upon the enforcement of conventional rights containing no separate
nondiscrimination clause a violation of Article 1.1 and the substantial right involved
would arise. If, on the contrary, discrimination refers to unequal protection by
domestic law, a violation of Article 24 would occur.
Apitz-Barbera v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 182 209 (August 5, 2008). This position was reiterated by the
Court in the judgments of Ferndndez Ortega and Rosendo Cantd. See Ferndndez Ortega, 199;
Rosendo Cantii, 183. In contrast, the Commission has established that:
The development of the right to equal treatment and nondiscrimination points to the
existence of several conceptions of it. For example, one conception is related to the
prohibition of arbitrarily different treatment-with different treatment understood as
meaning distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference-and another is related to
the obligation of ensuring conditions of true equality for groups that have
historically been excluded and are at greater risk of discrimination. Although both
views may be present in certain cases, each warrants a different response from the
State and a different treatment under the American Convention. To this must be
added the fact that under the different conceptions of the right of equality, a State's
actions and failures to act may be related to rights enshrined in the American
Convention or they may be related to any undertaking of the State that does not
affect the enjoyment of Convention-protected rights. Therefore, although certain
criteria can be used as a basis, the applicable Convention provisions must be
determined in each specific case by means of an analysis that takes into account the
individual or group of people affected; the reasons behind the alleged
discrimination; the rights or interests involved; the actions or omissions that gave
rise to it; as well as other considerations.
Case of Karen Atala, supra note 73, 80-81.
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orientation, and in relation to other prohibited factors that the interna-
tional and regional human rights communities might not have yet
recognized.2 30
Third, there is a need to further analyze the link between Articles
1.1 and 24 of the American Convention with the obligation to adopt
domestic dispositions contained in Article 2 of the Convention and other
crucial instruments for the protection of women's rights such as the
Convention of Bel6m do Pard. Fourth, it is important for the organs to
give content to key terms such as structural discrimination, systematic
discrimination, indirect discrimination, and disproportionate impact, not
only for women, but for other groups of the population at particular risk
for human rights violations and what these concepts mean for a state in
regard to its obligation to respect and guarantee human rights under
Article 1.1 of the American Convention. The recently submitted case of
Karen Atala and Daughters presents a unique opportunity for the Court
to set new ground in these spheres.2 3 1
Another important challenge for the system is how to apply the
findings of these three judgments to cases of violations under the Ameri-
can Declaration of Human Rights for states that have not ratified the
American Convention and have not accepted the competency of the
Court. Even though the precedent of the system has recognized the
American Declaration as a source of legal obligation for OAS Member
States,23 2 the content and scope of its provisions is still unclear in the
realm of women's rights. In this analysis, it is important to keep in mind
the precedent of the system, highlighting that the provisions of its gov-
erning instruments, including the American Declaration, should be inter-
preted and applied in light of the developments in the field of
international human rights law since those instruments were first com-
posed.233 In the author's view, this includes the precedent related to the
230. It is important to note that the Commission has already established that very weighty
reasons need to be advanced to justify a distinction between men and women in a state's law and
public policies solely based on sex. Accordingly, the Commission has held that statutory
distinctions based on status criteria-for example, race and sex-give rise to heightened scrutiny.
See id. 36. For an international analysis of the evolution process related to prohibited factors of
discrimination beyond those explicitly codified in international human rights instruments, see
United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 20, Non-
Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2009).
231. See generally Application (Case 12.502), supra note 72.
232. See Interpretation of the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 10, fl 35-45 (July 14, 1989).
233. See id. 91 37; The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A)
No. 16 T 114 (Oct. 1, 1999); Maya Indigenous Cmty. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L.N/II.122 doc. 5 rev. 1[ 86 (2005).
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American Convention of Human Rights, of which these three sentences
constitute a part. Therefore, the findings of the aforementioned judg-
ments should inform the interpretation of the dispositions contained in
the American Declaration of Human Rights. The recently admitted case
of Jessica Gonzales gives the Commission an opportunity in this
regard. 234
Another important challenge for the Court will be how to apply the
findings of these three court judgments to largely untapped areas of
women's rights law, such as their economic, social, and cultural rights.
The system has recognized a comprehensive catalogue of these rights in
the American Declaration, Article 26 of the American Convention, the
Protocol of San Salvador, and Article 4 of the Convention of Belim do
Pard, among other instruments, and they enjoy a significant level of rec-
ognition at the international level.2 35 Some of the most important rights
in this sphere, which are undoubtedly relevant for the protection of
women's rights, are the right to employment, education, health, and
social security, etc.236 The Commission and the Court will have to find
points of intersection in the future between the classical precedent of the
system, which has reached a pinnacle in the aforementioned three judg-
ments and fast emerging areas of women's rights law, such as their eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights.
It is important to note that these cross points between the classical
and the new are already occurring in the judgments of Cotton Field,
Ferndndez Ortega, and Rosendo Cantd. The victims in these three judg-
ments are women affected by poverty, which has rendered them more
vulnerable to acts of discrimination and violence by state agents and
private individuals. They encountered significant challenges when they
turned to the state structure for support and to obtain redress for the
violations suffered. The barriers they faced in their path to justice were
numerous and reveal what structural discrimination can look like in the
health and justice sectors. Their stories offer a face to and exemplify the
social exclusion that many women suffer throughout the Americas.
The author considers that these three court judgments provide
important legal precedent to develop in cases related to the economic,
234. See generally Jessica Gonzales v. United States, Petition 1490-05, Report No. 52/07,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.130, doc. 22, rev. 1 (2007).
235. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(1II) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2200(XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
236. See generally General Comment 16, The Equal Right of Men and Women to the
Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Art. 3 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, 34th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2005/4 (Aug. 11, 2005).
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social, and cultural rights of women. For example, as discussed earlier,
the Court in Cotton Field analyzes carefully the comprehensive reach of
the duties of prevention and protection of the State when a situation of
real or immediate risk to women is known to the State, and there is a
reasonable probability of this danger.23 7 This duty can be undoubtedly
applicable in future analysis related to the geographical, economic, cul-
tural, institutional, and structural barriers that women often confront to
duly exercise their rights related to health-including women's sexual
and reproductive rights2 3 8-education, employment, housing, and social
security, among other key economic, social, and cultural rights. The
judgments also delve into important principles applicable to the eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights of women that have been discussed
throughout this article, such as the link between violence and discrimi-
nation, gender stereotypes that negatively influence the actions of pre-
vention and protection from the different State branches, the obligation
to guarantee access to justice when human rights violations occur, and
the obligation to take into account the particular risk to human rights
violations that is confronted by certain groups of women at multiple
levels on the basis of age, race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic disadvan-
tage, among others. The Commission has accepted a group of cases that
could potentially give the system the opportunity to pronounce over
these intersections.239
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The inter-American human rights system is at a new era in the pro-
tection of the human rights of women. When analyzing the old and the
new, at the end of the day there is a body of legal standards to build on
237. See Cotton Field, 242-58.
238. The author notes that the Court has already begun addressing issues pertaining to the
economic, social, and cultural rights of women. For example, in its recent ruling in the case of
Xdkmok Kdsek v. Paraguay, related to the State's failure to guarantee the right to ancestral
property of the XAkmok Kdsek indigenous community in Paraguay, the Court highlighted that
extreme poverty and the lack of adequate care for pregnant women or women who have recently
given birth results in high mortality rates. The Court reasoned that this requires states to adopt
healthcare policies to prevent maternal mortality since women need special measures of
protection. In light of the aforementioned, the Court found that the State violated the right to life
established in Article 4(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of the
Convention, for its failure to adopt positive measures to prevent and avoid a risk to the right to
life. XAkmok Kdsek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 1[ 233-34 (Aug. 24, 2010).
239. See, e.g., Ana Victoria Sanchez Villalobos v. Costa Rica, Case 12.361, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 25/04, OEA/Ser.L./VIII.122, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2005); I.V. v. Bolivia,
Petition 270-07, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 40/08, OEA/Ser.L./III.134, doc. 5 rev. 1
(2009); Paola del Rosario Guzmin Albarracfn v. Ecuador, Petition 1055-06, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R., Report No. 76/08, OEA/Ser.L.IVIII.134, doc. 5 rev. 1 (2009); Elena Tellez Blanco, Petition
712-03, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 29/07, OEA/Ser.11V/II.130 doc. 22 rev. 1 (2007).
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and to develop in the future pertaining to the problems of discrimination,
violence, due diligence, and access to justice. There is a world of oppor-
tunities for the system at this particular moment in standard setting. The
system, however, is also at an important crossroads where it can choose
to move forward or backward in the development of legal standards.
In this context, one important bottleneck for the system to address
is not only how to build and expand on its current human rights stan-
dards, but how to implement the existing standards and how to eliminate
the gap between the theory and the practice. It remains to be seen how
the three court judgments in the cases of Cotton Field, Ines Ferndndez
Ortega, and Valentina Rosendo Canti are implemented in practice by
the State of Mexico. The system will undoubtedly employ a significant
amount of efforts to translate its recommendations and rulings into a
reality for the victims involved, in order to guarantee that these viola-
tions are not repeated. At some point, the system will have to examine
thoroughly the effectiveness of its recommendations when it comes to
their practical application in the Member States of the OAS.
In the author's view, the inter-American system will have the
opportunity to delve into many unanswered questions related to the civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights of women as the Commis-
sion entertains more petitions on these issues from different countries
throughout the Americas. It is key for the organs of the inter-American
system to take advantage of these opportunities to continue pushing the
boundary of women's rights and to persist in issuing real and concrete
standards that can guide state policies geared toward the protection of
the rights of women. The review by the organs of the system of individ-
ual petitions also needs to be complemented by the work of the other
mechanisms the inter-American system has at its disposal to further the
observance of the human rights of women at the national level. The
processing of individual petitions before the inter-American system is
only one component of the effective protection of the rights of women at
the national level. It is also important to note that the inter-American
system does not operate in a vacuum when it comes to the protection of
the rights of women and the furtherance of synergies between interna-
tional and regional developments, a process already begun by the Com-
mission in its decisions and solidified by the Court in its Cotton Field
judgment.
It is also paramount that the inter-American system continue to
respond to current social needs and that the interpretation of its instru-
ments evolves in synergy with current social conditions and the needs of
women from different ethnicities, races, ages, and socioeconomic condi-
tions. In this analysis, the legal standards of the system should consist-
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ently advance the indivisibility and interdependence of the civil,
political, economic, social, and cultural rights of women to achieve sub-
stantive gender equality and the full protection of their human rights.
The author closes being optimistic as to the potential of the system
in the future for standard setting within the sphere of women's rights,
despite the challenges ahead.
